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ABSTRACT
A United States Air Force presence in Europe promotes stability in the region
and displays an ongoing U.S. commitment towards a peaceful and prosperous
Europe. These forces also enable the U.S. to have an important voice in European
security matters that directly affect the United States. In addition, a United States
Air Force presence in Europe provides flexible and mobile combat forces which
are essential in sustaining American and allied security interests within the new
international order.
While the U.S. Air Force in Europe is being reduced in size, it is adjusting and
reorganizing to more effectively and efficiently perform its still critical roles
within the region. According to current plans, there will be approximately three
forward deployed active duty fighter wings stationed in Europe. U.S. nuclear
guarantees for Europe will be supported by U.S. Air Force multi-role
fighter/ attack aircraft. To maintain effective strategic agility capabilities within
the region, it will be essential that the United States continue to stay actively
involved within the European political and military environment.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The United States is adapting to the new world order by re-shaping its national
security and national military strategies to better face the challenges this new order
brings. Military strategies are no longer founded on the old international paradigm of
East vs West. The new environment requires flexibility and rapid mobility to respond
to regional crises and conflicts. The ability to successfully prevail militarily in these
types of contingencies requires greater emphasis on both strategic airlift and tactical
aviation capabilities. Examination of relevant issues influencing the United States Air
Force provides insight into regional security postures and operational requirements.
The United States is closely linked with Europe, and there has been a long term U.S.
Air Force presence in the region dedicated to insuring U.S. interests by bolstering
European security and well being. The United States Air Force in Europe will continue
to operate in concert with U.S. allies within the security framework provided by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. According to current plans there will be
approximately three forward deployed active duty fighter wings stationed in Europe,
capable of performing crisis response operations in the region. In addition to these
forward deployed forces, there will be two active duty fighter wings located in CONUS
tailored to fight in the Atlantic region. Including reserve units there will be a total of
eleven fighter wings planned and available for operations focused in the area. While the
Air Force in Europe is being reduced in size, it is adjusting and reorganizing to more
effectively and efficiently perform its still critical roles within and based from the region.
One important role the U.S. Air Force will continue to fulfill involves providing
Europe with viable nuclear forces. U.S. theater nuclear forces located in Europe will
consist solely of dual-capable fighter/ attack aircraft which will be limited to using
gravity dropped bombs. CONUS based ICBMs, strategic bombers, and SSBNs also
contribute towards allied nuclear guarantees. Providing our European allies with a
credible nuclear commitment serves as a deterrent against hostile actions and reduces
incentives for many European nations to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.
Effective strategic agility will be an essential element in successfully dealing with any
contingency of the future. Within Europe and the surrounding region, it will be critical
for the U.S. to maintain base usage and overfly rights. As U.S. influence decreases in
the region, there may be greater resistance to U.S. actions from these bases unless
completely supported by not only the host country, but by the majority of our allies. In
this respect, it is essential that the United States continue to stay actively involved within
the European political and military environment.
Other significant issues include current military strategy and structural
reorganizations, as well as arms control agreements. Current reorganizations, both in
the U.S. and NATO, will significantly affect Air Force operations of the future.
Changing threats, new technologies, and strategic innovations are changing the structure
of our forces and re-directing the way they will fight. Continuing arms control
agreements will have a significant effect on the size of our future forces and the missions
they can accomplish. It will be important to continually examine these issues to better
evaluate and update methods of operation.
A United States Air Force presence in Europe promotes stability in the region and
displays an ongoing U.S. commitment towards a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In
addition, these forces enable the U.S. to have an important voice in European security
matters that directly affect the United States. Finally, a United States Air Force presence
in Europe provides flexible and mobile combat forces which are essential in sustaining
American and allied security interests within the new international order.

I. INTRODUCTION
...military strength is not an alternative to a national search for peace. It is
an essential element of it.. .a national commitment to the search for peace not
backed up by military strength would be no policy at all. It would be a
pious expression of hope, devoid of either credibility or effect... 1
A variety of forces are shaping a new international order with major
implications for U.S. national security policy and military strategy. Within this
new international order U.S. military forces will be called upon to deter
aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests
against any potential foe. As the United States forges a new path in this
international order, the role of the military must adapt to face international
pressures and domestic constraints. The cold war provided a stable framework
that guided many policy issues, particularly those issues related to European
affairs. This framework no longer exists and future U.S. involvement in European
affairs, both political and military, is subject to dramatic reorientation. There are
numerous factors that may affect this reorientation including; economic
dependency, public opinion, political unity, and changing security requirements.
These changing security requirements will have a significant impact on the future
of the U.S. military in Europe.
lU. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power .
In the past the U.S. Air Force has played a significant role in the European
defense posture. As history has shown, effective air power plays an integral part
in any successful military endeavor. This was most recently re-emphasized in the
skies over Iraq during the Gulf War. How will this "new world order" affect the
United States Air Forces in Europe? To effectively answer this question requires
a working knowledge of the new political and military landscape. It is important
to recognize possible threats in this new order and to fully understand the
international dynamics influencing U.S. and allied security objectives. It is within
this framework that strategy and doctrine are formulated. This directly affects
force structure and sizing. Examining U.S. National Security objectives and
National Military Strategy will be useful in understanding the new direction in
which U.S. policy makers are approaching the new global environment. The U.S.
Air Force has recently published its new directional focus in the June 1990 White
Paper "Global Reach-Global Power" and re-emphasized many of these ideas in a
February 1992 testimony to Congress "Reshaping for the Future"2 by Secretary of
the Air Force Donald B. Rice. An examination of current Air Force direction will
be valuable in determining the possible roles of the United States Air Force in
Europe (USAFE). A discussion of the 'base force' concept as outlined in the
United States National Military Strategy will help evaluate what the U.S. Air
Force presence in Europe might look like in the near future. When discussing
Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice, "Reshaping for the Future," from
testimony to the House Armed Service Committee, February 1992.
issues relating to a U.S. Air Force presence in Europe, it is essential to discuss
how these forces participate within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). An examination of NATO military strategy and force structures will
contribute to better understanding of issues relating to a U.S. Air Force role in the
region. Of particular importance is examining the role of nuclear weapons in
Europe and how the Air Force continues to contribute to nuclear deterrence and
nuclear war-fighting capabilities. In addition, there are other issues that affect the
U.S. Air Force in Europe, such as limitations on strategic agility, current military
reorganizations, and arms control agreements that will be discussed. It is hoped
that this top down approach will provide a lens through which a clearer picture
of a U.S. Air Force presence in Europe can be envisioned.
II. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ARENA
Throughout the past 45 years the global security arena has been primarily
driven by confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The
dissolution of the Soviet Union has drastically changed current security
requirements, and Cold War policies of the past no longer apply. The old
international system provided a stable framework that acted as a focal point for
Free World policies. This focus has now been blurred by a whirlwind of dramatic
change. To formulate new strategies it is essential to analyze the changes taking
place and adopt policies that pursue defined national security ideals.
The most dramatic change in the international arena is occurring within the
former Soviet Union. The familiar hammer and sickle have been replaced by the
Russian tricolor. Russia and the independent republics are on the threshold of
embracing democratic ideals to guide their new governments. While there is
reason for optimism about the future, the situation should be handled cautiously
considering the possible instabilities of the current situation. The failure of the
1991 coup attempt was a great victory for democratic forces, however, it did
illustrate the fragility of the current situation. Political leaders in the former
Soviet Union continue to grapple with tremendous internal problems as they
attempt to reorganize political, military, and economic power. Throughout this
process one of the largest, most heavily armed territories on earth is proceeding
toward an uncertain, and perhaps dangerous, future.
The conventional forces of Russia and the other nations which form the
Commonwealth of Independent Nations are still very formidable. However, it is
improbable that a serious conventional challenge to U.S. and Western security will
reemerge from the Eurasian heartland for years to come, and if such an
eventuality did materialize, the West would have ample warning time. Though
not currently a direct threat, this military potential will continue to be a security
consideration within the region.
Russia will certainly remain a nuclear power with very substantial forces.
There are currently about 27,000 nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union;
15,000 of these are associated with strategic assets, 9,000 are with ground and air
forces, and the remaining 3,000 are dedicated to maritime forces. 3 There are
many concerns that surround the eventual disposition of these nuclear forces. In
addition to concerns over where the weapons will eventually be located are issues
regarding command and control, weapon safety and security, and material
disposal. Perhaps the most serious ramification arising from the changes
occurring in the former Soviet Union relates to the possibility of increasing
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to Third World regions. This
Thomas C. Reed and Michael O. Wheeler, "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in
the New World Order," (Washington, D.C., mimeo, December 1991) p. 17.
proliferation includes weapons hardware, warhead materials, and nuclear
technicians and scientists from the former Soviet Union.4
The events of the Gulf War, subsequent revelations regarding Iraq's nuclear
programs, and the uncooperative approach of Saddam Hussein's government
reinforce concerns about the spread of mass-destruction weapons to Third World
nations. Unstable, and potentially dangerous, Third World countries that are
actively pursuing these types of weapons include Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.
Within the new international order, controlling the proliferation of mass-
destruction weapons will be a top priority for the United States and its allies.
Attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction are but one problem stemming
from Third World nations in the Middle East.
The Middle East and Southwest Asia are very unstable regions. The coalition
forces ejected Iraq from Kuwait during the Gulf War. However, Saddam Hussein
still remains in power of a belligerent Iraq. Iran continues to support radical
groups, nationalism, and religious fanaticism. Other factors that contribute to
regional instability include the ongoing Arab- Israeli issue, water rights conflicts,
and the continuing rift between the rich and the poor. 5 The collapse of the Soviet
regime raises the possibility of new regional coalitions, particularly among former
Soviet Islamic republics and other nations in Southwest Asia. These historic
4The Pentagon, National Military Strategy, Washington D.C. 1992, p. 2.
Tbid., p. 3.
conflicts, fueled by arsenals of modern weapons, will continue to challenge
regional stability. The Middle East and Southwest Asia will continually pose
serious security threats for the U.S. and Europe. It is of vital economic
importance to the United States and European allies to have free access to
resources located in this region. In addition, stability within the region is closely
linked to European security due to close geographical proximity. American and
European military forces must maintain the option of responding, if circumstances
dictate, to a crisis within the region to protect and preserve pre-defined security
interests. While the Middle East and South West Asia are serious concerns for
European security, there are other problems closer to home that have significant
security ramifications.
The revolution in Eastern Europe, which eventually led to the crumbling of the
Berlin Wall and German reunification, also saw the dissolution of the Warsaw
Pact and the rebirth of independence for many regional states. While these events
have greatly reduced the immediate military threat to Western Europe, within
some states they have unleashed powerful nationalistic sentiment that has
manifested itself in regional unrest. The current situation in the Balkans is an
example of this unrestrained nationalism. Unrest in the Baltics is also a
consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union. These conflicts have helped
contribute to a massive influx of Eastern refugees into Western Europe. This in
itself poses serious strains within the region that must be considered in European
security planning. It is in the best interest of the United States and Western
Europe to promote stability within the region through active dialogue and
economic assistance. It also will be critical to maintain viable defense structures
to safeguard Western European security while offering security assistance to
Eastern European countries seeking democratic reform.
The recent changes discussed above in the international arena have
fundamentally altered the concept of threat analysis as a basis for force structure
planning. There is no longer a clearly defined threat. The threat of today is
instability and being unprepared to handle a crisis or war that is unexpected or
unpredictable. It seems inevitable that U.S. forces would be called upon again.
However, predicting the time, place, and circumstance will be difficult,
considering the volatile nature of the future security environment. Whatever form
the threat takes, it is essential that U.S. forces be able to respond if necessary.
The Cold War is over and the political and military landscape is reflecting this
dramatic reorientation. The new international arena offers hope for democratic
ideals and the transition to a more peaceful global coexistence. It is important to
understand this new framework in order to better comprehend security challenges
that face the U.S. and its allies. It is these security challenges that drive strategy
formulation and shape the structure of our forces. A discussion of relevant
strategies will be useful in better understanding a U.S. Air Force presence in
Europe.
III. STRATEGY AND FORCE DESCRIPTION
The United States has recently defined its new National Security Strategy and
National Military Strategy to face the challenges this "new world" brings. The
future role of the U.S. Air Force in Europe is defined within the boundaries these
new strategies dictate. It is therefore essential to be familiar with these
documents in order to study the Air Force's future function in Europe. This
study is not attempting to validate these policies within the new world order.
Instead, it utilizes them as a framework in which U.S. military forces will be
structured and operated within the near future.
A. UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
In August of 1991 the White House published the President's view of the
National Security Strategy of the United States. 6 These interests and objectives
are the executive articulation regarding U.S. national interests in the new world
order. The foundation of U.S. National Security policy rests on the following four
primary interests and selected objectives: 7
1) The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its
fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
^he White House, National Security Strategy of the United States,
Washington D.C. August 1991.
7
Ibid., p. 3-4.
• Deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States
and its allies- should deterrence fail- repel or defeat military attack and end
conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies.
• Effectively counter threats to the security of the United States, its interests
and its allies.
2) A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual
prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
• Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and
space.
3) Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and
friendly nations.
• Establishing a more balanced partnership with our allies and a greater
sharing of global leadership and responsibilities.
4) A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human
rights and democratic institutions flourish.
• Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might
seek regional dominance.
• Aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression,
coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.
These four national security interests and selected objectives provide the
guidance in which our national military strategies are built. The fundamental
objective of the U.S. armed forces is to deter aggression and, should this
deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any foe. Deterrence
10
remains the primary and central motivating purpose driving our National Military
Strategy.
8 This strategy is founded on the premise that the United States will
provide the leadership necessary to promote global peace and security. Changes
in East-West relations have shifted the strategic focus away from global war to
that of regional threats and crises. The new U.S. strategy emphasizes
multinational operations under the auspices of international bodies such as the
United Nations. However, the U.S. must retain the capability of acting
unilaterally if U.S. interests dictate. These principles are the foundations in which
a future role for the U.S. Air Force in Europe will be formulated. The National
Military Strategy provides guidance on how U.S. forces will be utilized in
promoting U.S. national interests.
B. UNITED STATES NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
To effectively evaluate the role of the U.S. Air Force in Europe, it is essential
to understand the basic foundations and principles of the United States National
Military Strategy. This strategy, built upon the national security interests of the
U.S., provides guidance for the branches to formulate specific doctrine. It is
essential to be familiar with this document in order to more effectively
understand the rationale for specific service branch Strategy. The National
8The White House, op. cit. in n. 6, p. 6.
11
Military Strategy is built upon the four foundations of Strategic Deterrence and
Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution.9
1. Strategic Deterrence and Defense
Recent arms control agreements and unilateral initiatives are optimistic
signs for real reductions in the arsenals of the nuclear powers. Unfortunately, the
threat posed by increasing numbers of potentially hostile states that are acquiring
and/or developing nuclear weapons is very serious. Due to these threats
maintenance of a modern, fully capable, and reliable strategic deterrent remains
the number one defense priority of the United States. A credible deterrent
requires a reliable warning system, modern nuclear forces, the capability and
flexibility to support a spectrum of response options and a defensive system for
global protection against limited strikes (GPALS). 10 Strategic deterrence and
defense is particularly important in Europe, where U.S. nuclear guarantees are
considered by many as a basic requirement for regional stability. A later section
will be devoted to this issue.
2. Forward Presence
U.S. forces deployed overseas show U.S. commitment, lend credibility
to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response






periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined
exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-
military contacts. Although U.S. overseas forces will certainly be reduced, the
credibility of our capability and intent to respond to crises will continue to
depend on judicious forward presence. A forward presence in Europe remains
critical for long-term European security and stability, as well as enduring
economic, cultural, and geopolitical interests. 11
3. Crisis Response
Maintaining U.S. forces capable of responding to regional crises is an
integral part of our military strategy. Regional crises may arise on very short
notice and U.S. forces must be able to respond rapidly to deter and, if necessary
fight unilaterally or as part of a combined effort. Crisis response may range from
a single discriminate strike to the employment of overwhelming force to defeat
a regional aggressor. This strategy recognizes that during a regional conflict,
force levels elsewhere cannot be reduced to leave the U.S. or its allies vulnerable
to other potential aggressors. U.S. troops stationed in Europe are essential to







As the global threat diminishes U.S. military forces will be reduced.
The ability to reconstitute is intended to deter any hostile power from militarizing
and, if this deterrence fails, to provide a global war-fighting capability. In
addition to activating the military industrial base, reconstitution involves
maintaining technology, doctrine, training, experienced military personnel, and
innovation necessary to retain a competitive edge in critical areas of potential
military competition. 13
The U.S. employs a set of Strategic Principles which build upon the
four National Defense Foundations. These principles capitalize on U.S. military
strengths and permit the exploitation of any military challenger. 14
• Readiness- Deterrence and crisis response dictate that U.S. forces maintain
a fighting force which can respond quickly and effectively to any regional
conflict.
• Collective Security- The U.S. expects to strengthen world response to crisis
through multilateral operations under the auspices of international security
organizations.
• Arms Control- The U.S. will strive to reduce military threats to national
interests, promote greater predictability into military relationships, and







• Maritime and Aerospace Superiority- The ability to quickly establish control
of maritime and aerospace operations provides for increased combat
effectiveness, fewer losses, and efficient employment of combat power in
critical areas.
Strategic Agility- Rapid movement of forces to conflict areas is required for
successful engagement. Regardless of location U.S. forces will be capable
of worldwide employment on short notice.
Power Projection- The U.S. ability to project power has strategic value for
crisis response and provides continued contribution towards deterrence,
regional stability, and collective security.
Technological Superiority- The U.S. must continue to rely on technological
superiority to offset quantitative advantages, to minimize the risk to U.S.
personnel, and to expedite decisive termination of conflict.
Decisive Force- An essential element of U.S. national military strategy is the
ability to rapidly assemble the forces needed to overwhelm potential
adversaries and in so doing terminate conflict swiftly with minimum loss of
life.
The National Defense Foundations coupled with the Strategic Principles
form the framework in which each service functions under their specific branch
orientated strategy. The separate services utilize their inherent strengths to
formulate their contribution towards U.S. national security. The USAF White
Paper entitled Global Reach-Global Power15 outlines the U.S. Air Force contribution
towards national security.
15Department of the United States Air Force, A White Paper: The Air Force
and National Security: Global Reach-Global Power, Washington D.C. June 1990.
15
C. AIR FORCE STRATEGY
Responding to the dramatic changes occurring in today's security
environment, the Air Force has sought to capitalize on its inherent characteristics-
speed, range, flexibility, precision, and lethality16- to develop a force with agile
and responsive capabilities which compliments their sister services. The Air Force
has emphasized five main objectives and associated forces to provide a planning
framework to support the U.S. National Defense Strategy. 17
1. Sustain Deterrence
Deterrence is, has been, and will remain the foundation of U.S. national
strategy. Only nuclear attack threatens the very survival of the United States,
making sustained nuclear deterrence the first priority. The Air Force provides
two legs of the nuclear triad forces- land based ICBMs and long range bombers.
Although the threat of an all-out nuclear exchange is minimal, the price to be paid
for complacency could be catastrophic.
2. Provide Versatile Combat Force
The Air Force helps sustain deterrence across the potential spectrum
of conflict by providing versatile combat forces for power projection and combat
operations. USAF assets- long range bombers, tactical fighters, airlifters, tankers,
air/space-based surveillance and communications systems- offer highly flexible
16United States Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1, March 1992.
17United States Air Force, op. cit. in n. 15, p. 5-15.
16
methods for meeting U.S. national security requirements. The ability to
effectively concentrate force over great distances- to change the military and/or
political conditions necessitating the response- is a key attribute of the Air Force.
One convincing rationale for maintaining an Air Force presence in
Europe is forward deployment for crisis response. The U.S., either unilaterally
or in concert with European allies, must be able to project military power quickly
to regional crises or conflicts. This capability is essential, politically and militarily,
to enhance regional stability and show U.S. commitment while promoting
American influence and access.
3. Supply Rapid Global Mobility
The contribution of U.S. airlift and tanker forces takes on increased
importance when balancing the necessity for global reach with reductions in
overseas bases. Strategic mobility is essential for a credible deterrent posture.
Without the ability to project combat forces, there is no viable conventional
deterrent. Airlift provides rapid mobility which is critical for effective power
projection. Tankers enhance the range, ordnance loads, and flexibility of aircraft
from the Air Force, the Navy, the Marines, and allied nations.
The ability of U.S. airlift and tanker forces to operate using bases in
Europe will remain essential in fulfilling U.S. national security objectives.
Increased instability and uncertainty will heighten the importance of a U.S.
capability to respond to any crisis quickly.
17
4. Control the High Ground
USAF surveillance, communication, and navigation systems provide
U.S. political and military leaders with global knowledge and situational
awareness that is essential in today's international arena. During Operations
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, USAF communication, navigation, and
surveillance systems increased the combat capabilities of all the services. AWACS
today and JSTARS in the future are rapidly deployable systems that can function
as the "eyes and ears" of the joint force commander.
The ability to use European bases as staging areas for U.S. AWACS,
JSTARS (if deployed), and related airborne command posts and airborne relays
is essential in meeting future security requirements. These elements act as
deterrent forces as well as providing key war-fighting capabilities.
5. Build U.S. Influence
The Air Force plays an important role in building U.S. influence
overseas by strengthening security partners and relationships. Air Force aircraft
are potent policy tools that build U.S. influence and presence through airlift
activities with overt geo-political overtones that the Air Force calls air movements
of national influence. Deployments of AWACS aircraft signal presence, a show of
force, and a symbol of U.S. concern, all without the negative connotations that can
be raised by combat forces. 18
18Department of the Air Force, The United States Air Force and U.S. National
Security: A Historical Perspective 1947-1990, Washington D.C. 1991, p. 5.
18
Humanitarian operations also contribute to building U.S. influence.
Military humanitarianism provides a bridge between Cold War military
capabilities and the vision of a new world order. 19 The Air Force's ability to
deliver rescue personnel, foodstuffs, medicine, shelter, and other critical
emergency supplies quickly to any location worldwide is unmatched. Measuring
the impact of these operations is difficult to quantify, but there is no question that
these humanitarian operations have helped strengthen bonds of friendship with
numerous nations overseas. 20
The capability to enhance security conditions, strengthen security
partners, and project U.S. influence using Air Force assets is an important aspect
of U.S. security commitments for Europe and the surrounding region. European
bases will continue to play key roles in conducting security assistance, air
movement, and humanitarian missions throughout the region and for adjacent
regions.
Global Reach-Global Power depicts the U.S. Air Force's role in pursuing
defined national security objectives. It provides a framework within which all
USAF assets will be utilized. Arguments for a continued USAF presence in
Europe have already been discussed. However, what will the actual composition
of these forces be? Within the new National Military Strategy the concept of the
19Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell, "Military Humanitarianism",




Base Force is defined. This Base Force concept provides the foundation in which
the services will structure future force requirements and this will certainly
influence the U.S. Air Force in Europe.
D. THE BASE FORCE
As U.S. armed forces restructure in recognition of the changing security
environment, it is essential to preserve a core capability to deter aggression,
provide meaningful presence abroad, respond to regional crises, and maintain an
ability to rebuild a global war-fighting capability if necessary. These forces must
be prepared to meet the demands throughout a spectrum of environments from
peace to multiple regional crises. In each case, the force must be flexible enough
to adapt to the changing circumstances while maintaining those essential
capabilities necessary to deter and defend. During peacetime, forces not
dedicated to strategic deterrence will primarily be responsible for forward
presence and preparing for crisis response. The forces dedicated for forward
response are largely driven by interests in various regions of the world, as well
as commitments to allies and formal collective security agreements. Those forces
earmarked for crisis response will train for regional contingencies and often serve
in forward presence roles as they participate in various deployments and joint
and combined exercises in various regions of the world. This carefully managed
blend of highly ready forces provides the nation with global strength to deter
potential aggressors, influence world events, and encourage continued democratic
20
and economic progress and human rights in an atmosphere of enhanced
stability.
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The Base Force maximizes the capabilities of each component and integrates
active and reserve forces from each of the services into an effective military force
capable of responding across the spectrum of conflict. Forward presence forces
are primarily drawn from the active component of all the services. During a
regional crisis reserve forces can be utilized as necessary. If a crisis becomes
larger or more protracted, force composition will increasingly rely on reserve
components. 22
The Base Force is subdivided into four conceptual force packages and four
supporting capabilities. This framework is a force sizing tool and not a blueprint
for a new command structure. The four conceptual force packages are; Strategic
forces, Atlantic forces, Pacific forces, and Contingency forces. The four
supporting capabilities include; Space, Transportation, Reconstitution, and
Research and Development. 23
1. Strategic Forces
To deter the threat of nuclear aggression, the U.S. must continue to
maintain a credible triad of modern, flexible, and survivable systems. For a more
21The White House, op. cit. in n. 6, p. 19.
-The Pentagon, op. cit. in n. 4, p. 23.
^Ibid., pp. 20-25.
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detailed discussion see nuclear issues section. SDI efforts have been refocused to
develop a viable global protection against limited strikes (GPALS) capability that
could be used to defend U.S. deployed forces, friends and allies, and the United
States.
2. Atlantic Forces
The United States will maintain forward stationed and rotational forces,
a capability for rapid reinforcement from within the Atlantic region and from the
United States, and the means to support deployment of larger forces when
needed. Forward Presence forces in Europe must be sized, designed, and
postured to preserve an active and influential role in the Atlantic Alliance and in
the future security framework for the region. Air Force fighter wings possess the
flexibility to meet a wide range of theater commander tasks. They can gain air
superiority, suppress enemy defenses, and strike tactical and strategic targets with
precision. In addition, the Air Force in Europe provides the core basing,
command and control, and mobility infrastructure to facilitate the receipt of
reinforcing units. Three to four wings are required to meet these forward
presence demands. 24 In the event of a regional crisis the U.S. must have the
capability to reinforce forward presence forces while still maintaining




the U.S. are also kept available for immediate deployment to the region. 25 By
combining available forces already stationed in the region with other U.S. based
forces, both active and reserve, there are eleven Air Force fighter wings planned
to be available for conflict contingencies within the Atlantic region. In addition
to these forces dedicated to the Atlantic region, there will be assets available from
the Pacific region if necessary. 26
3. Contingency Forces
The U.S strategy for the "come-as-you-are" arena of spontaneous, often
unpredictable crises, requires fully-trained, highly ready forces that are rapidly
deliverable, and initially self-sufficient. Therefore, such forces must be created
primarily from the active force structure and tailored into highly effective joint
task forces that capitalize on the unique capabilities of each service and the
special operations forces. Reserve forces will perform much of the airlift and
other vital missions from the onset of any contingency operation. Contingency
forces include forward stationed and deployed forces from all branches as well
as special operations forces, and U.S. based units. U.S. based Contingency forces
include an airborne corps headquarters, 5 Army divisions, 7 Air Force fighter








spectrum of air combat capability to include air superiority, strategic attack,
mobility, air refueling, and support of surface forces. Selected forces are
organized into composite wings- Air Force multi-aircraft organizations specifically
tailored for rapid power projection abroad and in support of air-land operations.
Contingency forces complement forward deployed assets in that they can provide
an initial response capability where there are no forward deployed forces.
Selected Contingency forces could deploy to Europe in the event of a regional
crisis. If deployed they would serve as reinforcements to combat forces already
performing forward presence roles in Europe or elsewhere as required.
4. Transportation
Regional focus, flexible/adaptive planning, and reduced forward
presence have all combined to increase U.S. reliance on strategic mobility. The
United States depends on strategic mobility to rapidly deploy and sustain decisive
combat power in any region where U.S. national interests are threatened. This
capability is essential in the Atlantic region to secure national and allied security
objectives. For a more detailed discussion of strategic agility, see chapter 4.
This new Base Force concept is designed to fulfill U.S. national security
requirements in the new, and changing, international arena. The same
environment that generated change in U.S. national military force structure and
planning is also forcing changes within the NATO military structure. When
discussing a U.S. Air Force presence in Europe, it is essential to discuss factors
relating to NATO.
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E. NATO STRATEGY AND FORCE COMPOSITION
U.S. Air Force equipment and personnel stationed in Europe are an integral
part of the NATO military requirement. Important issues that should be
addressed when discussing a U.S. Air Force presence within NATO include:
defining the basic the rationale for such a presence, examining the current
military strategy being developed by NATO, looking at NATO Air Doctrine,
describing Air Force assets that will probably fall within NATO, and discussing
how possible future security organizations, other than NATO, may affect U.S.
military involvement in the region. In any discussion of a U.S. military presence
in Europe, it is useful to examine current rationale supporting such a
commitment.
1. Rationale behind a U.S. Military Presence in Europe
The security of the United States remains linked to that of Europe.
The United States has a clear national interest in helping to preserve
democratic values, stable governments and economies, and peaceful
relations among nations of Europe. Twice before in this century, the
outbreak of war in Europe led to U.S. involvement in major military
conflicts, with great losses of American lives and fortune. 28
Within this broad context there are significant reasons for U.S. troops to be
stationed in Europe.
28The John Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, The United States and NATO in
an Undivided Europe, Washington D.C. 1991, p. 4.
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• U.S. prosperity is closely related to European prosperity.
• The presence of U.S. military forces promotes stability within the region.
• U.S. forces contribute in defending against military threats stemming from
an unstable and changing former Soviet Union.
• U.S. forces in Europe help promote the continuation of the favorable trends
in the former Soviet Union and surrounding region.
• Continued democratization of Eastern Europe remains an American
ideological as well as strategic interest.
• U.S. troops give the United States a seat at the European table and a voice
in many economic and political matters as well as security affairs.
• U.S. troops in Europe act as a forward presence to respond, either
unilaterally or in concert with other forces, to any military objective defined
by the U.S, her allies, and friends.29
Europe remains a vital element in U.S. National defense, both in and of itself
and because security and stability in Europe contribute to the security of the
United States. Our forward presence in Europe not only serves to protect
America and American interest; it provides us a relationship with Europe
that fosters solidarity - the Atlantic link - and gives Americans the
opportunity to be of influence as important decisions are made on collective
defense. We need to remain involved and influential in European affairs
with a competent, credible, operationally significant force in Europe ready
for a multifaceted mission.30
Having forces stationed in Europe is a critical prerequisite for
successful crisis response, which may very well be the most significant application
29
Ibid., p. 1.
30General John R. Galvin, Commander in Chief U.S. European Command, "Still
Vital to U.S. Security", Defense, July/August 1991, p. 10.
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of U.S. military forces in the foreseeable future. However, given the current
European security environment, coupled with American economic factors, U.S.
force levels in Europe will certainly be reduced. A complete withdrawal from
Europe would not only be de-stabilizing for the region, it would adversely affect
U.S. national interests.
Withdrawing U.S. Forces from Europe would greatly diminish U.S. influence
on the Continent both politically and economically. Therefore, a major U.S.
policy goal is retaining NATO, and for this purpose, Washington is prepared
for major changes in NATO's missions. 31
Knowing that a U.S. military presence in Europe supports both U.S.
and European security objectives, it will be prudent to examine current NATO
strategy.
2. NATO Strategy
With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the NATO strategy of "Flexible
Response" became out-dated. NATO needed a new military direction and in
November 1991, the sixteen allied nations collected in Rome to sign a new NATO
strategy statement. The Rome document, titled "The Alliance's New Strategic
Concept," marks a fundamental break with "Flexible Response."32 NATO's
31Werner J. Feld, "Toward a European Security and Defense Policy," Military
Review, July 1991, p. 25.
32Larry Grossman, "NATO's New Strategy," Air Force Magazine, March 1991,
p. 26.
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mission is no longer to thwart an attack from the East. Instead, NATO's new
mission is to manage small crises on NATO's periphery. General John R. Galvin,
who served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), explained:
We have shifted from a strategy of immediate defense against a very large
threat to a strategy of crisis response.
He continued by explaining that the Strategy is for the West to use its power:
to bring down the level of confrontation in a crisis and to maintain the
peace.33
This new concept places emphasis on tailoring the response to a crisis
in order to deter but not provoke any adversary. These forces must be capable
of escalating the size and readiness of their combat power to the appropriate level
needed to defuse the crisis, and then quickly de-escalating to avoid
provocation. 34 The new strategy calls for Allied nations to organize highly
mobile, combined-arms, rapid reaction units
^Ibid., p. 28.
•^Lieutenant General Richard Evraire, "Designing NATO's New Military Force
Structure," Canadian Defence Quarterly, February 1992, p. 12.
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able to respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of which are
unforeseeable. 35
Supporting this relatively small collection of ready military forces
would be a larger contingent of in-place forces, which could be raised to higher
readiness, and an enhanced Alliance ability to mobilize its reinforcements,
reservists, and replacement equipment in Europe and North America. To support
this basic defense strategy NATO is reorganizing forces into three main categories
of military power: Reaction Forces, Main Defense Forces, and Augmentation
forces.
The Reaction Forces would consist of multinational forces allocated to
the major NATO commanders for early military response to a crisis. These fast
moving forces would be divided into two groups - the Immediate Reaction
Forces(IRF), and the Rapid Reaction Forces(RRF). The Immediate Reaction Forces
would consist of approximately 5,000 troops and would be able to deploy within
72 hours to any region of Allied Command Europe. General Galvin explained:
The Immediate Reaction Force is not a strike force. Ifs not an expeditionary
force. This is a reinforcing force, to be used within NATO. 36
35Grossman, op. cit. in n. 32, p. 28.
^Ibid., p. 29
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USAF officers report that the IRF air component would likely consist
of one or two squadrons of F-15 air-superiority fighters. The RRF would be built
around a capable multinational corps and trained and equipped to provide
significant combat power at a time and place chosen by NATO leadership. 37
These forces would consist of 50,000 to 70,000 forces and would be capable of
deploying within one week. The RRF will have a major air component that
would be commanded by a Luftwaffe officer. In addition to a large complement
of modern air-superiority fighters, the air component will have a multinational
force of hard-hitting ground-attack planes: F-16 multi-role fighters, Tornado GR
Mk. 1 attack aircraft, and GR Mk. 5/7 Harrier jump jets, among other air-ground
systems. 38
The Main Defense Forces will be regionally oriented, national and
multinational, forces that maintain a lower level of readiness and are composed
of active and reserve forces. Selected "ready maneuver forces" will be maintained
in high states of readiness and availability for use in support of crisis
management or for early operations in preparation for defense.39
The Augmentation Forces will consist primarily of North American
forces but will also include European forces. These active and reserve units will
require longer warning times and will be heavily dependent upon sea and air
37General John R. Galvin, op. cit. in n. 30, p. 4.
^Grossman, op. cit. in n. 32, p. 29.
39Galvin, op. cit. in n. 30, p. 5.
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strategic lift. They provide appropriate operational reserves that may not be tied
to specific regions. Some of these forces will also consist of "ready maneuver
forces" available in support of crisis management. 40
Strengthening these three categories will be the focus of NATO force
planning. In addition to these changes in force planning, the Rome strategy
document offers radically different concepts of operations. One significant change
is that Alliance leaders will no longer assign to specific nations the responsibilities
for defending specific sectors of a front. As a result, Western forces will no
longer maintain a fixed, in-place, linear defensive stance along cold war
boundaries, where for years NATO ground and air forces stood guard. These
changes in NATO's overall strategy have significantly affected the way in which
NATO air forces operate and train. While examining a U.S. Air Force presence
in Europe, it will be useful to discuss some key points regarding NATO's Tactical
Air Doctrine.
3. NATO Tactical Air Doctrine
Since 1970 there have been four primary sources for NATO's tactical
air doctrine: (1) the national interests of the United States, the United Kingdom,
and West Germany (currently Germany); (2) the institutional interests of the
United States Air Force, the Royal Air Force, and the Luftwaffe; (3) the




Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE), the 2nd allied Tactical Air Force, and
the Northern Army Group; and (4) the overriding interests of the planning staff
at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).
From these sources NATO's doctrine for planning and conducting
combined air operations has been developed by national delegations joined by
representatives from NATO's military commands. This occurs during the annual
meeting of the Interservice Tactical Air Working Party (TAWP) at NATO
headquarters in Brussels. The goal of the Tactical Air Working Party in
developing combined air doctrine is to improve combat effectiveness by
enhancing the inter-operability of NATO's constituent forces. 41
The four most debated issues have been: (1) the command and control
of allied air power, (2) the organization and conduct of air missions in support
of ground forces, (3) introduction of the Follow-on Force Attack concept, and (4)
means of Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD). 42 Throughout the 1970's the
issue of command and control was the center issue of NATO's internal debates
on the effective use of tactical air power. From the late 1970's to the present,
methods for the conduct of air-support missions and air-ground coordination
have drawn the most attention. In 1979 the concept of Follow-on Force Attack
(FOFA) for interdicting Soviet second echelon forces was first discussed. It
41David J. Stein, The Development of Tactical Air Doctrine, R-3385-AF (Santa
Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, December 1987), p. 8.
^Ibid., p. 5.
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generated new questions about the command and control of air-support
operations. Since 1978 the TAWP has repeatedly considered, and rejected, U.S.
proposals to make the suppression of enemy air defenses a major counter-air
mission. The debate over command and control of allied air power stems from
the differing philosophies between Britain's Royal Air Force in Germany (RAFG)
and the U.S. Air Force in Europe (USAFE).
Britain's Royal Air Force in Germany is the "lead element" in the 2nd
Allied Tactical Air Forces (2ATAF) and it emphasize coordinated decisions
between air and ground elements at echelons of command that are close to the
battle area. It emphasize command and control of the forces at the "lowest
possible levels". This philosophy encourages the local coordination of air and
ground forces whenever possible. British argue that this type of effective combat
aircraft management, along with methods of "procedural control,"43 reduce the
need for costly infrastructures.
In contrast, the USAF-led 4th allied tactical air forces (4ATAF)
emphasize making decisions at the "highest practicable level". This philosophy
favors "positive control" methods that permit using air power in a flexible but
centrally managed fashion. Both of these arrangements and control facilities each





Great Britain and the United States both ratified NATO Tactical Air
Doctrine and supported its statements of principle regarding the "centralized
command" of air forces at the highest practicable level and the "decentralized
execution" of air operations. However, this agreement was made possible largely
by careful wording of key sections. This wording allowed each constituent air
force and regional command to apply the "common principles" in its own fashion.
Therefore, the 2ATAF could continue to follow the Royal Air Force tradition of
squadron autonomy in making command decisions without reference to higher
echelons and could operate out of "pockets of control" throughout the region.
Meanwhile, the U.S. and German air force elements in 4ATAF could continue to
conduct their air operations through highly articulated, centralized control
systems where decisions regarding the flexible management of air power were
made at the "highest practicable level."44 The second major topic of debate was
the organization and conduct of air power operations in support of ground forces.
Key issues involved in NATO's doctrine on Offensive Air Support
operations were the tasking of air assets for conducting support missions and the
influence of ground force commanders on target nomination and development.
Once again, the differences between U.S. and U.K. command and control
philosophies played a critical role in Offensive Air Support doctrine development.
^Ibid., p. vi.
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The USAF and its elements in the Central Region had a theater-wide
concept of offensive airpower employment. They viewed tactical air assets as a
flexible means of supporting ground forces, but one that required a highly
centralized command point for effectiveness. 45 Although the RAF and its
elements in the Central Region agree with the USAF regarding the flexibility of
airpower, they do not favor a highly centralized command structure. The RAF
prefers a more direct and immediate means of coordination and implementation.
It maintains that national chains of command provide a better instrument for
coordination than does NATO direction.
In 1978 the British proposed a revision to NATO Offensive Air Support
doctrine that re-defined the two attack operations of Close Air Support and Air
Interdiction. The British introduced Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAD that they
believed would ensure responsive and direct applications of air support. The
United States was able to provide a reworked version of the original British
proposal on Battlefield Air Interdiction that accommodated British desires in
retaining some form of offensive air support tied to land force requirements while
preserving USAF interests in both the theater-wide aspect of airpower
management and the autonomy of airpower in executing support operations. The




1) Close Air Support (CAS). Close Air Support is air action against hostile
targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those
forces. This means that the aircraft is under positive or procedural control.
2) Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI). Battlefield Air Interdiction is air action
against hostile surface targets which are in a position to directly affect friendly
forces and which requires joint planning and coordination. While BAI missions
require coordination in joint planning, they may not require continuous
coordination during the execution stage.46
In 1983 the concept of Follow-on Force Attack (FOFA) emerged from
an array of operational concerns and controversial proposals for renewing
NATO's conventional capabilities. FOFA was introduced due to new assessments
of Soviet conventional capabilities, heightened concern regarding the pressures for
early NATO nuclear use because of the weaknesses of its conventional defense,
and the general need to maintain alliance cohesion on the old strategy of Flexible
Response.
FOFA, as envisioned when originally introduced, entailed deep attacks
beyond the range of organic assets to be conducted in conjunction with engaging
enemy forces in the close-in battle.47 This combat tactic would exploit the Soviet
combat organization and its mode of tactical advance. It would also disrupt time






With the collapse of the Soviet Union, old static line defense concepts were no
longer applicable and a greater emphasis has been placed on maneuver. FOFA
has been crafted into a more flexible concept called "Joint Precision Interdiction
OH)."
The basic concept behind JPI is similar to that of FOFA, "to keep forces
out of the battle before they can form into battle lines."48 In fact, as far as
General Oaks is concerned this could be called either FOFA or JPI because, in his
view, "they're kind of blood brothers."49 What makes JPI "joint" is that the Army
now has the ATACMS (Army's Tactical Missile System), an interdiction weapon,
so there has to be an integrated air and land operation, just as the air defense
fighter and antiaircraft missile operations must be coordinated. 30 Another
doctrinal issue involves repeated American proposals to promote the function of
suppressing enemy air defenses (SEAD) from its original NATO status as a
support activity to that of a major mission.
Most of NATO's member air forces and their ground and naval
counterparts view SEAD as a support activity. Although, the USAF eventually
accepted the NATO view, their own doctrine made SEAD a mission equal in
importance to offensive and defensive counter-air missions within the context of
48General Oaks from: Charles W. Corddry, "NATO's New Model," Air Force





a counter-air campaign. Important reasons that explain varying views on the
doctrinal importance and status of SEAD are the differences between U.S. and
allied capabilities for conducting such operations and their respective fiscal
abilities to modernize their inventories. Another important factor that permeates
these differing viewpoints is that only the United States developed the electronic
sophistication and the advanced munitions needed for the conduct of SEAD
campaigns.
Historically the allies were reluctant to accept U.S. proposals regarding
the status of SEAD because they feared that statements of operational need and
force requirements would follow on the heels of doctrinal change, obliging them
to acquire additional financial burdens. They would more than likely have to
give up other capabilities to acquire SEAD assets. Since U.S. SEAD assets were
made available theater-wide, there was little incentive to change the status of
SEAD from a support activity. The debate regarding the status of SEAD is
ongoing, and for the present it will remain a supporting activity in NATO air
doctrine.
Current reorganizations and strategy updating certainly will affect the
eventual outcome of many of these doctrinal issues. Reorganization issues will
be discussed in greater detail in chapter III. With a basic understanding of some
of the issues affecting NATO's Tactical Air Doctrine, it will be useful to describe
the U.S. Air Force contribution to NATO.
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4. U.S. Air Force Assets Within NATO
USAFE is slimming down, dropping to about 3.5 fighter wing
equivalents from the long maintained 8.5 wing equivalents, closing out more than
half of its main operating bases in Europe, and eliminating about 25,000 personnel
spaces to get down to 44,200. 3l The command is transferring more than 400 of
its approximately 700 fighter aircraft. These are the USAFE statistics for the
projected U.S. force level of 150,000 troops to which General John R. Galvin,
NATO and U.S. European commander, wanted to reduce by 1995. Most of the
USAFE drawdown is scheduled to be complete by the end of 1993. The U.S. Air
Force in Europe contribution to these forces will consist of the following; 32
86th Fighter Wing, Ramstein AB Germany
Two F-16 multi-role fighter squadrons
36th Fighter Wing, Bitburg AB Germany
Two F-15 air-superiority fighter squadrons
52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem AB Germany
One F-16 multi-role Fighter Squadron
One A-10 close air support aircraft squadron
One OA-10 forward air controller squadron
48th Fighter Wing, RAF Lakenheath UK
Two F-15E dual-mission strike fighter squadrons
32nd Fighter Group, Soesterberg AB, the Netherlands






• Three squadrons of special operations aircraft based at RAF Alconbury, UK
• 435th Airlift Wing, C-130s, Rhein-Main AB, Germany
• 100th Air Refueling Wing, KC-135s, RAF Mildenhall, UK
Within this structure General Oaks says he will maintain the capability
for reconnaissance- which may be of first importance in rapid reaction operations.
In addition to understanding the basic U.S. Air Forces dedicated to NATO, it will
be important to examine issues regarding future European security organizations.
5. Issues Regarding Future European Security Organizations
NATO was formed to provide security for Western Europe against a
Soviet invasion. That threat no longer exists and NATO's role in Europe is
changing. There is ongoing debate, in both Europe and North America,
questioning whether NATO should remain the European security vehicle for the
future or if another organization should replace it. Historically NATO has been
an extremely successful organization, and it will probably remain the bedrock of
European security for some time. However, NATO does not currently fulfill all
the requirements necessary to ensure a lasting peace in the region.
Two important issues that NATO may not be able to adequately
address in the future include out-of-area concerns and membership limitations.
Within the new security environment threats outside of the NATO area will
constitute a serious European dilemma. The environment in which NATO
currently functions does not freely allow its military forces to be used outside of
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NATO territory. An effective European security organization of the future cannot
be hindered by such a limitation. In addition to the out-of-area concerns, there
remains a membership limitation problem. In order for a future security
organization to be effective in maintaining regional security, it must include the
governments of the former Warsaw Pact as well as European and North
American governments. While many of the governments from the former
Warsaw Pact have requested membership in NATO, their inclusion into the
organization is not likely in the near future. Other organizations that may
provide an alternative option for a European security vehicle include the Western
European Union (WEU), the European Community (EC), and the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). A meaningful discussion of these
organizations that attempts to predict which institution, if any, will provide the
best vehicle for European security is beyond the scope of this paper. It may be
likely that just one of these organizations alone cannot fulfill all of the
requirements necessary for a viable European security organization. This notion
is emphasized in NATO's 1991 Rome Declaration:
The challenges. ..cannot be. ..addressed by one institution
alone...Consequently, we are working towards a new European security
architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU
and the Council of Europe complement each other. 33
53Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, North Atlantic Council, 8
November 1991.
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Regardless of the exact form that any future European security organization may
take, it will be in the United States' best interests to actively participate within its
framework.
It is difficult to predict with any certainty a specific U.S. role within a
future European security establishment. Current international relations within the
region are, not surprisingly, fluid and uncertain. However, it is important for the
U.S. to look ahead and begin to evaluate possible policy directions.
...in those instances in which the interests of the United States and
some or all of its NATO allies coincide, the United States should
encourage the active cooperation of its allies. The particular legal or
institutional framework within which coordination occurs is of little
importance. ..The United States should remain flexible enough to
welcome other arrangements, such as European coordination through
the WEU or the EC. Even in those cases in which U.S. and allied
interests differ, the United States should seek the requisite political
understandings to enable U.S. forces to use NATO facilities in support
of out-of-area operations. 54
Whatever form any future European security organization takes, it will
be important for the U.S. to remain flexible within that framework. U.S. military
forces located in Europe must be able to continue fulfilling regional security
guarantees as well as serving to further U.S. national interests when necessary.
For now, NATO will remain the European military organization in
which allied security issues are addressed. U.S. military forces will continue to
^John Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, op. cit. in n. 28, p. 188.
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be dedicated to NATO and will train and fight within the framework established
by NATO officials. As long as these forces continue to function within the NATO
framework, it will be essential to continue exploring important issues that affect
NATO. With regard to the USAF presence in Europe, it will be particularly
important to continue to examine NATO strategy issues, including NATO's
tactical air doctrine. One very important issue that requires detailed examination
is the continued nuclear presence in Europe.
F. THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE NUCLEAR PRESENCE IN EUROPE
The creation of nuclear weapons changed the face of warfare like no other
previous technological innovation. The stakes were raised to a global scale, in
that an all-out nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union
could have devastated the entire planet. With the collapse of the Soviet Union,
such an all-out exchange has become an extremely remote prospect. However,
nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented, and this reality must be taken into
account when forming future policy. Outdated nuclear strategies need to be
revisited, as well as the force structures utilized to support them. Dramatic
changes continue in Europe, and nuclear requirements are being molded to adapt
to the new environment.
Throughout the cold war the protection of European allies against a massive
Soviet invasion was the primary reason for stationing U.S. nuclear weapons on
European soil. Since a Soviet invasion is no longer a credible threat, U.S. and
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NATO nuclear strategies have been redefined to meet new security requirements.
The U.S. Air Force has been, and will continue to be, a critical element for U.S.
and NATO nuclear planning requirements in Europe.
In order to gain a better understanding of the U.S. Air Force nuclear
presence in Europe, it will be useful to discuss present and possible future issues
that may affect nuclear strategy and force composition within the region. An
overview of the current political and military landscape that focuses on nuclear
related issues will provide a framework in which a clearer understanding of
nuclear strategy and force composition can be attained.
1. Nuclear issues within the Current Political and Military
Environment
U.S. security policy since World War II was largely dominated by the
Cold War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. In late 1989 the Berlin Wall fell; it
was perhaps the premier symbol of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has
been met with high optimism tempered with concern over regional stability. The
many reasons for optimism include the peaceful reunification of Germany, the
revolution in Eastern Europe, and the apparent reduction in the possibility of a
global nuclear war. However, the Cold War relationship was relatively
predictable and provided stability to many areas of the globe. Now that this
situation has drastically changed, the international arena is marked with
fragmentation and nationalistic uprisings in many parts of the world. Events in
the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East attest to the regional instabilities the
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end of the Cold War has fostered. While the end of the Cold War has signalled
a dramatic improvement in the prospects for peace, security and economic
progress, it is still a world where crisis, war, and challenges to U.S. vital interests
will continue to be very real possibilities. Within this new international order
fostering European security will continue to be a U.S. vital interest.
The United States continues to have a fundamental interest in
preserving European peace and security. Twice before in this century, the
outbreak of war in Europe led to U.S. involvement in major military conflicts,
with great losses of American lives and fortune. For now, the likelihood of a
major European war seems very remote. However, continued U.S. involvement
in the European security environment serves as a hedge against an uncertain
future, and it provides a political commitment to reassure alliance security
arrangements. Therefore, it is essential that the U.S. remain militarily involved
in Europe. Given the dramatic changes in the recent years, it is essential that new
military strategies be formulated to fulfill current security requirements. Of
particular interest is what role nuclear weapons will have in the new political and
military landscape.
One interesting characteristic of the new international environment is
the decline in the perceived utility of nuclear weapons. Because U.S. nuclear
weapons were apparently not a factor in deterring the Iraqi attack on Kuwait and
were not used during Desert Storm, some analysts have concluded that nuclear
weapons do not have a role in the types of wars most likely to be faced by the
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U.S. in the future. In addition, advanced conventional munitions (ACMs) proved
accurate and powerful enough to destroy hardened Iraqi targets. ACM
performance during the war fueled the argument that ACMs may be able to
substitute for nuclear weapons in some "strategic" targeting scenarios. 55
However, even if ACMs can be utilized for strategic targeting, nuclear weapons
cannot be disinvented; and this fact must be reflected in current policy planning.
There are several reasons why the United States must continue to rely
on nuclear weapons for national security. First, deterrence of nuclear attack will
remain, for the foreseeable future, a critical element of U.S. national security. U.S.
nuclear weapons will be needed to deter nuclear attacks on the U.S. homeland
and to guarantee the survival of the U.S. as an independent nation with its
peoples, values, and institutions intact. Also the U.S. should retain a sufficient
number of nuclear weapons to prevent coercion, blackmail, or aggression by
future nuclear states. In addition, a secure nuclear reserve force may be needed
to provide escalation leverage during acute political crises. Second, nuclear
weapons are needed to underscore U.S. international political and military
commitments. The extension of U.S. security guarantees to its allies may
eliminate the need for those allies to acquire their own nuclear weapons, thus
promoting nuclear non-proliferation. Third, nuclear weapons are required to
provide insurance against a breakdown in arms control commitments and/or the
55
U.S. Air Force White Paper, "Nuclear Sufficiency in the 1990s and Beyond:
The New Strategic Equation," AF/XOXXI, 10 April 1992, p. 4.
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international non-proliferation regime. It is not clear that the Commonwealth of
Independent States will coalesce sufficiently to effectively implement either the
START agreement or the Gorbachev/Yeltsin unilateral disarmament initiatives.
The potential re-emergence of an authoritarian regime raises the possibility of a
breach of international arms control commitments. 56 Given the necessity for
nuclear weapons within the context of the new international arena, it will be
useful to examine the current nuclear strategies of the U.S. and NATO.
2. Current U.S. and NATO Nuclear Strategy
The old nuclear strategies the United States and NATO adhered to
during the Cold War are no longer applicable in the new political and military
landscape. Strategies that focused on the old monolithic Soviet threat no longer
apply. The threats faced today are difficult to define or predict, and this makes
detailed strategy planning difficult at best. This fact is reflected in current U.S.
strategic thinking which seems to be very general in nature. In light of this, it is
sensible to discuss current U.S. strategic thinking in its most general form. The
main underlying theme defining current strategic thinking pivots around the
concept of deterrence.
Deterrence is prevention of an action by the fear of its consequences-
a state of affairs brought about when rational individuals in positions
of authority are persuaded there is a credible prospect of devastating
^Ibid., pp. 11-14.
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retaliation far outweighing anything they conceivably could gain if
they initiate a specific action. 57
Without a specific threat it is difficult to formulate a more precise
nuclear strategy. A broad strategy of deterrence has a built-in degree of flexibility
that may be necessary in dealing with "unknown" future crises. Another aspect
of the new landscape is an increased likelihood of nuclear proliferation.
An increased probability of nuclear proliferation is one reason why the
United States is developing a missile defense system. The Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) introduced by President Reagan has been redirected to pursue a
system providing Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). As
intended by the Bush administration, GPALS was planned to counter threats
posed by global ballistic missile proliferation and from an accidental or
unauthorized launch resulting from political turmoil. In addition to protecting
the United States, GPALS could defend U.S. forward-deployed forces and U.S.
allies. While GPALS could help protect NATO allies, the U.S. nuclear
involvement in the NATO nuclear strategy is a more important factor.
Given the sweeping changes that have recently occurred in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, NATO allies were required to rethink old
strategic policy. In November 1991 the old NATO strategy of flexible response
57Thomas C. Reed and Michael O. Wheeler, op. cit. in n. 3, p. 17.
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was replaced by a new strategic concept. There were difficulties in devising a
sound strategy without a clearly defined threat. However, NATO officials claim
they do not need an enemy; rather NATO can now concentrate on what to protect
and how to protect it. 58
The new strategy will continue to be a 'war prevention' strategy, but
now with more emphasis on protecting peace and managing crises: stability and
its underpinnings are at the center of this. Thus, military strategy and the roles
and tasks of the armed forces will not relate exclusively to war-fighting capability,
but will include much broader functions. Greater emphasis will be placed on the
management of crises, with appropriate political and military measures. Military
roles in the future will include intensified military contacts with members of the
forces in Central and Eastern European nations, increased levels of cooperation
and greater transparency in strategy, force structure, and defense planning. 59
NATO's multinational forces for crisis response and defense will be
highly mobile and flexible, and will be able to react to a range of potential risks
with both regional and transatlantic reinforcement as necessary. Much longer
warning time allows for a smaller "forward presence" and a greater reliance on
the ability to build up forces as and when they are needed. With the greater
likelihood of defusing a crisis and mounting a successful conventional campaign,
58Lieutenant-General J.K. Dangerfield, "A New Military Strategy for NATO,"




the need for the alliance to contemplate using nuclear weapons is very remote.
However, as mentioned previously, nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented and
NATO has modernized its nuclear strategy to meet current security requirements.
NATO's nuclear strategy, laid down in the new strategic concept, is
endorsed by all members, including France.
The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the allies is political: to
preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will
continue to fulfill an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of
any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military
aggression. 60
In addition, nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an
essential political and military link between the European and the North
American members of the Alliance. The NATO nuclear forces will have the
necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be
perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing
war. These forces will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve
peace and stability. 61 Within the framework of NATO's new Strategic Concept
the United States Air Force will play an important role in fulfilling the new
strategy's nuclear policy.
60The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, North Atlantic Council, Rome,




3. U.S. Air Force: Current Nuclear Role in Europe
In the new security arena the U.S. Air Force will continue its nuclear
responsibilities supporting two legs of the strategic triad. The Air Force will be
responsible for the ICBM leg and the bomber leg of the triad. However, given the
dramatic recent changes there will be less emphasis on the ICBM component of
the Triad. Both the ICBM forces and the bomber forces have been greatly affected
by ongoing arms control agreements between the United States, the Soviet Union,
and the successor governments of the Soviet Union. A more detailed discussion
of ramifications from these agreements will be discussed later in the paper.
NATO will maintain adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe
which will provide an essential link with U.S. strategic nuclear forces reinforcing
the trans-Atlantic relationship. These forces will consist solely of dual-capable
aircraft which could, if necessary, be supplemented by offshore systems. Sub-
strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances
on surface vessels and attack submarines. There is no requirement for nuclear
artillery or ground-launched short-range missiles and they will be eliminated. 62
The U.S. Air Force contribution towards these NATO nuclear forces will consist
of dual-capable F-lll, F-15E, and F-16 fighter/attack aircraft stationed in Britain
and Germany. 63 If needed these aircraft could operate from Britain, Germany,
>2
Ibid., paragraph 56.
63Air Force Association, "U.S. Air Forces in Europe," Air Force Magazine, May
1992. p. 92.
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Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey, Italy, and Greece. 64 In October 1991 U.S.
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and other NATO defense chiefs cut the nuclear
arsenal in Europe by 80 percent. These cuts reportedly stipulated that only 700
nuclear gravity bombs will be available for these dual-capable fighter/ attack
aircraft.
63
In summary, the U.S. Air Force ICBM forces, located in the U.S., and
strategic bomber forces will continue to provide the European Allies security
protection in the form of extended deterrence guarantees. In addition, dual-
capable fighter /attack aircraft located in Europe will provide the flexibility
needed to fulfill security requirements in the new unstable environment. These
cumulative forces not only provide European security assistance but also provide
a very important political and military link that enhances European and North
American relations and promotes regional stability.
4. Future Nuclear Issues
Dramatic changes in the former USSR have profoundly altered the
threats against which the United States and the West, generally, must make their
security arrangements, and, particularly, their plans for nuclear forces. Even in
MDavid S. Yost, "Western Nuclear Force Structures and the Future of
European Security," in Beatrice Heuser, ed., Nuclear Weapons and the Future of
European Security (London: Brassy's for the center for Defence Studies, King's
College, University of London, 1991).
65Alan Riding, "NATO Will Cut Atom Weapons for Aircraft Use," New York
Times, 18 October 1991, p. Al.
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a dramatically transformed world there will continue to be international tensions,
crises, and wars in which U.S. forces may be engaged. Given the current
international environment, the two primary concerns regarding future nuclear
threats to the U.S. and the European Allies include policies that could grow out
of a counterrevolution in internal Russian politics and the threat from new
nuclear states outside of Europe.
The difficulties of the domestic situation within the successor states of
the Soviet Union could lead to a dramatic reversal of the process of internal
reform. For a long time there will be a danger of a Russian relapse that could
bring to power a nationalistic, militarized, and possibly adventurist regime in
Moscow. Despite the economic, social, and political problems of Russia, such a
regime would have access to a vast military, including a large nuclear arsenal.
Military, including nuclear, threats would surely be part of such a regime's
bullying diplomacy. 66
The other significant nuclear threat the U.S faces stems from nuclear
proliferation. As the confrontation with Iraq dramatized, conflicts in remote areas
with and among regional powers - many likely to be nuclear-armed or capable
of becoming so ~ will become more important in the future. Given the likelihood
66Walter B. Slocombe, "The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in a Restructured
World," in Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A. Maaranen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in
the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia, and North America, p. 55.
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of other nations acquiring nuclear weapons in the future, the United States, and
other acknowledged nuclear states, are faced with the task of managing a world
with multiple nuclear powers. Arrangements for rapid exchange of data in the
event of third-country (or accidental or unauthorized) nuclear incidents would
promote stability if such an event occurred. Future strategy and doctrine must
deal seriously and systematically with how, and whether, U.S. nuclear and other
weapons might be used to respond to (or even preempt) third-country nuclear
(and conceivably chemical) attacks. Thus, a critical mission for U.S. security policy
in the future will be to retain the capacity to contain such threats, and in
particular to rebuild both U.S. and allied conventional and nuclear forces as
needed to face such crises. Issues relating to policy formulation and force
structure that will be relevant in the future include a greater emphasis on missile
defenses, a shift in targeting doctrine, and the need to maintain modern nuclear
forces.
The new technology embodied in the SDI program has made missile
defense capability a realistic, achievable, and affordable concept. 67 The
successful deployment of the Patriot missile in the Gulf War has generated greater
interest in missile defenses. With the spread of nations developing both ballistic
missile capabilities and weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. will need to deploy
missile defenses in order to protect the United States and its Allies from these
67Dick Cheney, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
January 31, 1992. p. 22.
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future threats. Another important issue relating to the future of U.S. nuclear
policy is changes in targeting doctrine.
New and future technologies will provide greater accuracy for both
nuclear and non-nuclear weapons delivery. This increased accuracy could lead
to an even greater emphasis on counterforce targeting, which would eliminate
many of the "sticky" problems associated with countervalue targeting doctrine.
In addition, a realistic targeting policy that takes greater multipolarity into
account is required for the future security arena. One other important issue
facing U.S. nuclear forces in the future is modernization.
As long as nuclear weapons remain in the hands of other nations, and
as long as the future of the former USSR is uncertain, there will be a need for the
United States to continue to maintain survivable, modern, flexible, and effective
nuclear forces. The United States also needs survivable, redundant, and enduring
command and control systems. It is particularly critical for these aspects of U.S.
nuclear war-fighting capabilities to be modernized as the numbers of systems
dramatically decrease. It will be important for the U.S. to maintain its
technological advantage into the future.
It does seem advisable to have at least one large combat aircraft and one
ballistic missile in development or production into the foreseeable future.
Moreover, the next generation SSBN should be planned while boatyards
retain competency with SSNs. 68
^Reed and Wheeler, op. cit. in n. 3, p. 33.
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Even in the face of reduced military budgets, a viable modernization plan will be
critical for the future effectiveness of U.S. nuclear forces.
The invention of the atomic bomb drastically altered the face of warfare
and forever increased the price of all out-war between nuclear countries. Some
see nuclear weapons as basically immoral weapons that should have never been
invented. However, the last 45 years have yielded unprecedented relative peace
among the major military powers. While it is impossible to know without a
doubt that nuclear weapons were the reason for this period of peace, it is just as
impossible to know otherwise. Regardless of one's philosophical beliefs regarding
nuclear weapons, the simple fact remains that they cannot be disinvented. With
that in mind, it is prudent for the U.S. to formulate, and update, policies and
strategies that attempt to insure the healthy existence of the U.S. and its allies.
In order to more clearly understand complex security arrangements
protecting Europe, it is useful to have a working knowledge of these U.S. nuclear
forces and how they interact within the larger strategic context of U.S. extended
deterrence guarantees. Nuclear forces dedicated to Europe's security are an
important aspect of a healthy and cooperative European-American relationship.
U.S. Air Force dual-capable aircraft stationed in Europe will constitute the only
U.S. nuclear presence located on the European continent in the foreseeable future.
These forces not only serve as a hedge against an unknown, and possibly
dangerous, future; they also provide an important political link that maintains
positive and productive ties between the U.S. and Europe.
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IV. SELECTED ISSUES AFFECTING THE U.S. AIR FORCE IN EUROPE
The U.S. Air Force in Europe functions in a very diverse political and military
environment. In addition to examining strategies and force compositions, it is
necessary to discuss other factors which influence these forces and how they
operate. Some of these factors include the ability to move troops and equipment
to desired locations, current reorganizations, and ongoing Arms Control
negotiations. One issue that greatly affects military efficiency is strategic agility.
A. STRATEGIC AGILITY: A STRATEGIC CULTURAL APPROACH
The United States is politically, economically, and militarily tied to Europe.
The United States benefits from a healthy Europe and has a vested interest in
maintaining stability in the area. A U.S. military presence in Europe provides
deterrence against any possible aggressor and contributes to European stability.
Having basing rights gives the U.S. a forward presence that is a basic pillar in our
national military strategy. This presence gives the U.S. critical power projection
capabilities that contribute to deterrence and allow for effective crisis response.
In addition, the U.S. military presence gives the U.S. a voice in European security
issues. U.S. basing privileges are the cornerstone behind effective strategic agility
within the region. This paper will define strategic agility as the capability to
rapidly deploy U.S. forces, stationed in CONUS and overseas, to any foreseeable
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military contingency. A critical aspect of the strategic agility equation is to have
basing and overflight rights with friendly nations. 69
Better understanding of the future of U.S. strategic agility in Europe is aided
by analysis of historical trends regarding U.S. basing and base usage in Europe.
The analysis in this thesis focuses on U.S. basing and usage rights in Britain and
Germany, since the majority of USAFE assets are located in these two countries.
In addition to policy trends relating to these issues, this thesis will examine
Germany's and Britain's strategic culture and how this may relate to possible
policy decisions.
The comparison of strategic cultures will, it is hoped, shed some light on
the differences in perceptions and policy decisions between the United States,
Britain, and Germany with regard to basing issues. It is important to note that
strategic culture is just one of many possible factors that contribute to a nation's
policy making behavior. It is expected that a clearer image of a country's
decision-making rationale can be acquired through the study of strategic culture.
The concept of strategic culture refers to a nation's traditions, values,
attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular
ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to
the threat or use of force. The strategic culture derives from its history,
geography and political culture, and it represents the aggregation of the
attitudes and patterns of behavior of the most influential voices; these may
69General John R. Galvin, Statement before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, 3 March 1992. p. 9.
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be, depending on the nation, the political elite, the military establishment
and/or public opinion. 70
With a better understanding of strategic culture and how it affects U.S. basing
issues, it may be possible to formulate interpretations that could guide policy
related decisions, particularly regarding the effectiveness of U.S. strategic agility
in the region.
1. A History of U.S. Base Issues in the United Kingdom
To reach informed judgments about what the future may hold with
regard to U.S. strategic agility from the United Kingdom, it is necessary to begin
with a history of U.S. air bases and their uses. The initial approach to U.S. bases
in the United Kingdom had roots in the 'special relationship' that had grown
between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill during World War II. The
United Kingdom was the most politically stable country in Europe for the U.S.
administration to consider as a basing option. Britain had obvious military
attractions in that operations could be mounted from its soil in order to intervene
in any conflict in Europe while at the same time affording a high degree of
survivability.
The main motive for pressing ahead with acquisition of basing rights
was U.S. national security considerations- particularly, the basing of nuclear forces
70Ken Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed", from Carl G.
Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990).
59
in Europe. The primary consideration at the time was the limited range of the B-
29 bombers, which made overseas bases an operational prerequisite. The U.S. Air
Force had two criteria for prospective basing:
First, that the bases must ensure that all possible routes to [the USA] are
protected via overseas basing of defensive fighters; and second, that bases
must be close enough to all potential enemies so that bombers could reach
targets within the strategic heartland of an adversary. 71
The basing of nuclear bombers in Britain was believed to have a deterrent effect
against a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe, and also filled the gap
while Britain was developing its own nuclear forces.72
Contributing factors to why Britain was the logical choice for U.S. base
acquisitions in Europe included France's and Italy's initial refusal of air bases
because of possible adverse political ramifications. In addition, Britain had the
added attraction of having hosted 165 U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) installations
between June 1942 and December 1945. This was significant for two reasons:
first, the bases could be readily modified for very heavy bomber (VHB)
operations, and there were several ideal locations in East Anglia well suited to
this purpose; and second, the British populace was accustomed to the idea of a
71Simon Duke, US Military Forces and Installations in Europe, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 294.
"Ibid., pp. 292-293.
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foreign military presence stemming from the war. Psychologically, it would be
less of a trauma to have a U.S. military presence in the U.K. than in most other
European countries. 73
These circumstances eventually led to the Spaatz-Tedder talks held on
25-26 June and 4-6 July 1946. A tentative agreement was reached that the RAF
would prepare four or five East Anglan bases by mid-1947 for use by U.S.
bombers in time of emergency and that the USA would obtain RAF cooperation
in the modification of certain bases to support atomic operations.
The Berlin crisis in 1948-49 provided the justification for the
introduction of further U.S. forces into Britain. The USAF judged that the crisis
reinforced the case that there was indeed a need for overseas bases. Secretary of
Defense James Forrestal put three reasons forward why sending B-29s to Britain
was important. 74 First, it would underline to the American people how seriously
the United States viewed the sequence of events. Second, it would give the
American and British forces involved experience with how to deal with these
types of operations. Third, and most significantly, he saw it as vital to send the
B-29s first and then formalize an agreement later. Forrestal was worried that the
situation might deteriorate and the British would be compelled to reverse their






that the Air Force's visit would be of longer duration than the 30-60 day
temporary duty tours. In addition, a third bomber squadron was requested and
approved to deploy to Britain from Germany.
In 1950 the first moves were made towards formalized negotiations.
The U.S. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Hector McNeil stated:
Both the British and American governments recognized the mutual
advantages of continuing the groups here, and that the British must proceed
to make available the fields required in the midland areas. 75
The major problems with the basing issues were of a budgetary nature.
Negotiations began at an ambassadorial level and an agreement was reached for
future basing rights. The 'Ambassador's Agreemenf , as it is commonly known,
was remarkable in that no time limit for the base durations was established.
Negotiations continued with the Attlee-Truman and Truman-Churchill
negotiations.
The Attlee-Truman negotiations, followed by the Truman-Churchill
negotiations, concluded with what is often referred to as "the base agreements."
Key elements of the Attlee-Truman negotiations included an agreement, though
not specifically written, that neither the U.S. or Britain will use an atomic weapon




The use of British bases involved British sovereignty and that it was
therefore natural that the United States would seek acquiescence before
launching a war from them.76
The Truman-Churchill negotiations concluded with an official statement
that remains the only public written agreement regarding the use of bases in the
United Kingdom by U.S. forces. The communique, issued jointly by Churchill
and Truman, stated:
Under arrangements made for the common defense, the United States has
the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the
understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a
matter for joint decision by His Majesty's Government and the United States
government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. 77
Interpretations of the agreement have been notoriously difficult.
Vagueness has been a traditional part of the working arrangements of the
communique so the United States would not feel that it was constitutionally tied
and the United Kingdom would feel that it had some kind of consultation
guarantee. The U.S. retaliation against Libya on 15 April 1986, operating out of






In the evening of 14 April 1986, a USAF strike group took off from RAF
Lakenheath and RAF Upper Heyford simultaneously. The F-lllFs from
Lakenheath and the EF-lllAs from Upper Heyford were part of a strike force
destined for targets in Libya. The fighters were refueled by KC-10 and KC-135
tanker aircraft from RAF Fairford and RAF Mildenhall enroute to their targets
around Tripoli and Benghazi. The role of the American forces operating out of
Britain, it was said, was crucial to the military success of the operation aimed at
suspected terrorist training and bivouac sites in Libya.78 The strike led to serious
political ramifications for both the British and the Americans and brought to the
surface many pressing questions including the vagueness of the 1950-52 base
agreements.
In a parliamentary debate immediately following the raid, Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher stated:
...the arrangements under which American bases are used in this country
have been the same for well over thirty years and they have not changed.
Under those arrangements our agreement was required.79
This may have been true but only in the narrowest sense, as only heads of
government and those closely associated were involved in the decision. It seems
78Simon Duke, US Defense Bases in the United Kingdom, St. Martin's Press,
New York, 1987 p. xvii.
^Duke, op. cit. in n. 71, p. 300.
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likely, from all the public materials, that not all of the cabinet were involved in
the Libyan raid decision. The 1950-52 base agreements were further attacked by
Mr. Dave Steel who stated:
If damage is not to be caused to the NATO Alliance, there must be no doubt
as to the conditions under which the American bases in this country are
used. 80
The actual motives behind using the British bases for the raids are also
a critical issue relating to U.S. base usage. The official justification for British
involvement in bombing Libya has been that the USAF's British-based F-llls
possessed the technical capacity for precision night bombing of highly specific
targets, with minimum civilian casualties and risk to U.S. pilots. 81 However, this
claim is somewhat thin in that other equivalent military options were available
that did not necessitate the use of British bases. One such option could have been
to use NAVY A-6 aircraft based on carriers in the Mediterranean as the primary
attack aircraft for all the strikes. The same 'Pave-Tack' system fitted to the F-
lllFs operating from RAF Lakenheath were also fitted to the A-6Es in the
Mediterranean. It seems from published evidence that the decision was more
political than military.
80Duke, op. cit. in n. 78, p. xviii.
81Malcolm Spaven, "A Piece of the Action: The Use of U.S. Bases in Britain''
from; Mad Dogs: The US Raids on Libya, Pluto Press, London 1986, p. 17.
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Political explanations are varied and difficult to verify, but the leading
arguments include the desire of the U.S. Air Force to get 'a piece of the action',
the U.S. desire to have at least one European ally involved with the raid for
popular support, and a desire on the part of the U.S. government to unilaterally
assert its position of power in the region. The actual reasons for conducting the
raids in the manner undertaken were undoubtedly a composite of varying
rationales and motives.
2. British Strategic Culture and U.S. Basing Issues
Ken Booth states that strategic culture:
...represents the aggregation of the attitudes and patterns of behavior of the
most influential voices; these may be.. .the political elite, the military
establishment and/or public opinion.82
In the case of the Libyan raid, it is clear that the political elite, particularly
Margaret Thatcher, almost single-handedly, committed Britain to the course of
action taken. It is more than likely that the 'special relationship' between the
Prime Minister and Ronald Reagan strongly influenced the decision. This is an
example of how a country's elite can represent a segment of a nation's strategic
culture make-up regardless of political sentiment. By analyzing related aspects
82Booth, op. cit. in n. 70, p. 2.
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of British strategic culture, a foundation can be built that will be useful in
determining possible policy trends regarding U.S. bases in Britain.
A 1985 Gallup Survey indicated that 51 percent of the British public
answered affirmatively when asked whether the United Kingdom should rid itself
of American nuclear bases, whereas 41 percent replied negatively.83 Looking at
certain aspects of British strategic culture should give us insight into these survey
results.
In 1948, the U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James sent the
Secretary of State his detailed analysis of the anti-American mood. His report
stated:
in and out of government... attitudes towards the U.S. border on the
pathological. Almost every day brings new evidence of (Britain's) weakness
and dependence on the United States. This is a bitter pill for a country
accustomed to full control of her national destiny.84
Over forty years later the ambassador considered that anti-American accusations
in Britain had reached a fevered pitch, and that the British response to the U.S.
raid on Libya might persuade American elite and public opinion that it was time
^Dean Godson, "British Attitudes Toward the United States", from; Martin
Holmes, British Security Policy and the Atlantic Alliance: Prospects for the 1990s,




to bring home "our boys" from Europe.85 According to a leading British
observer, Godfrey Hodgson, this sentiment has not impinged seriously upon
policy, there is probably more anti-British feeling in America than anti-U.S. feeling
in Britain and that pro-Americanism in Britain is more prevalent than anti-
Americanism. Nonetheless, it is still useful to analyze this negative sentiment and
possible policy implications. Part of this anti-American sentiment stems from
British suspicion of American encroachment on British sovereignty.
In his letter to his constituents in Oldham, Michael Meacher described
a massive encroachment by America on the British right to run their own affairs.
He claimed that this encroachment included secret contingency plans in the event
of a possible nuclear attack to hand over large areas of Britain to control by U.S.
forces and the placement of CIA personnel in the Ministry of Defense. 86
Similarly, Anthony Wedgwood Benn has said that a U.S. president, whom the
British people do not elect or control and cannot remove, has the power to make
war from British territory and hence make it a prime target. He stated that this,








One other aspect to Britain's strategic culture is a deep sense of national
pride. This pride stems from a long history of military successes including Henry
the V's unlikely victory over the French in the battle of Agincourt and the
victories of World War I and World War II. When discussing the Royal Navy's
involvement with suppressing the slave trade in the nineteenth century, Irving
Kristol stated,
...such action defined the kind of power Britain wanted to be. It was a
matter of national identity, not foreign policy in any strict sense of the
term.88
Further evidence of this national pride can be seen regarding the Gulf War:
Some Britons would want to react like France, but most would not. If there
is going to be dangerous work to do in the Middle East they would feel
ashamed to let the Americans shoulder the burden on their own...when it
comes to shouldering world responsibilities we are more than a match. 89
Given this intense national pride it is sometimes difficult for the British to accept
having to depend on the Americans for certain aspects of their defense. If there





were other feasible alternatives, the British would rather shoulder the burden
without the help of the United States.
The original factor that placed U.S. bases in Britain is gone. The threat
of Soviet attack no longer exists. With the new international arena come new
rationales for U.S. bases in Britain. The predominant explanations are that these
bases strengthen nuclear deterrence in the region by providing military linkage
between the United States and NATO and that these bases provide forward
presence for U.S. forces. Besides these direct military reasons, these bases serve
as a symbol of NATO unity and indicate a commitment by the U.S. to support
European stability.
With the lack of a tangible military enemy and the desire for greater
European autonomy, the strength of the ties that kept U.S. bases in Britain is
weakening. However, because of economic and political ties there is no reason
why all these bases will be removed in the near future. A greater challenge for
the U.S. is determining the manner in which these bases can be used. The Libyan
raid was a unique event that may very well have been a by-product of the
'special relationship' between Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.
Within the emerging security environment, a greater emphasis on
British-American cooperation will be a necessity if the U.S. desires to use these
bases for "Libyan type" raids. While U.S. support will remain important to
European countries, it will not be as essential as it was during the Cold War
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years. The British government will rightfully insist upon approval prior to any
military action staged from these facilities.
3. A History of U.S. Base Issues in Germany
The deployment of U.S. troops to Germany arose from the post-war
situation in Europe and was motivated by two primary concerns. First, U.S.
military deployments were seen in the context of a containment strategy. Post-
war Soviet expansion into Europe was taken seriously by the allies. With respect
to containment, post-war Germany represented an ideological battlefield between
the powers of East and West. The potential for serious conflict was demonstrated
in the Berlin crisis of June 1948. The second reason to deploy U.S. forces to
Germany was to accommodate French and British fears about the rearmament of
Germany and a possible resurgence of German military power. Before examining
the post-war U.S. forces in Germany, it will be useful to discuss the role of the
occupation forces.
The occupation zones in Germany were established by the London
protocol of 12 September 1944 and, upon the surrender of the German armed
forces on 7-8 May 1945, Germany was occupied within the borders established in
December 1937. The Protocol established the Allied administration of Germany's
four occupation zones and the control of Berlin by the four Allied powers. The
U.S. zone of occupation was located in south and south-west Germany, with
smaller contingents in Berlin and Bremerhaven.
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The Potsdam Conference of 17 July-2 August 1945 ensured the
dependence of Germany for the indefinite future on foreign security guarantees.
According to an official communique published by the U.S. State Department, the
purpose of the agreement was to extirpate German militarism and Nazism and,
in order to eliminate Germany's war potential, 'the production of arms,
ammunitions, and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going
ships shall be prohibited and prevented'.90 The Potsdam conference had the
result that Germany could not defend itself in any shape or form and was thus
completely reliant upon some form of foreign military presence.
The first steps toward a post-war collective defense effort were made
when the Dunkirk Treaty was signed in March 1947. The Treaty was established
'to prevent any further aggression by Germany and [to preserve] peace and
security'. 91 The WEU was formed in March 1947 and was a collective defense
organization that was intended to meet the dangers of possible German as well
as Soviet aggression. The major milestone in the establishment of the Western
security system was the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance in April
1949.
Communist aggression occurred much sooner than leaders in America
and Europe expected. The outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 had a profound




impact on the permanence of U.S. forward deployed military forces globally. The
possibility of similar aggression occurring in Europe led to American and Allied
concern. On 9 September 1950 President Truman announced that:
...I have today approved substantial increases in the strength of United
States forces to be stationed in Western Europe in the interest of the defense
of that area...92
This announcement meant the addition of four divisions to Europe to join the two
already there. More significantly, the status of U.S. forces already in Europe was
changed from an occupation force to a combat force that would help contain the
Soviet Union. The U.S. military presence in the FRG, and indeed Europe as a
whole, may have helped to shore up some of the more urgent defense needs of
Western Europe, but the problem of how to integrate the FRG into some kind of
European defense structure remained.
An initial attempt at German integration faltered when plans for a
European Defense Community (EDO were rejected by the French. The failure
of the EDC led to renewed efforts to connect the FRG with NATO. In fall 1954
a treaty was drafted that ended the occupation regime and integrated the FRG
into the Alliance structure. In May 1955 the FRG formally joined NATO. In
92Daniel J. Nelson, A History of U.S. Military Forces In Germany, Westview
Press, Boulder and London, 1987 p. 41.
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return for membership, the FRG agreed to permit the stationing of British, French
and American forces on its soil for the indefinite future.
The decision to increase the U.S. military presence in the FRG was seen
by the U.S. as stabilizing for Western and U.S. security. It was seen by the
Germans as a sign of genuine German-U.S. solidarity and cooperation. The
decision was viewed by all as a profound and long-term American commitment
to Europe.
The number of U.S. troops in Germany remained over 300,000 from
1955 to 1968 when, because of the Vietnam War, almost one third were
withdrawn. Changes in strategy, namely the shift from 'massive retaliation' to
'flexible response', also contributed to force shifts and reorganizations. In
addition, domestic debates inspired by Senator Mike Mansfield and others also
contributed to a decline in U.S. troop levels in Europe through the 1970's.
Relations between the U.S. and the FRG deteriorated during 1981 when
Pentagon personnel planned for three additional U.S. based 'Reforger' divisions
in the FRG, accompanied by a move of U.S. forces closer to the German border.
The proposal met with strong criticism in the FRG, where the government was
in the midst of trying to bring a substantial budget deficit under control. The U.S.
response was to threaten a withdrawal of U.S. forces unless the FRG seemed more
enthusiastic and willing to pay for more of its share of defense. A compromise
was reached whereby the German government agreed to make payments on
various projects to support the arrival of CONUS-based emergency troops and an
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addition of 2000 German troops to guard the stocks and equipment needed for
their arrival.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the prime rationales for
U.S. forces in Germany, that of containment, no longer exists. However, U.S.
forces now in Europe continue to contribute to collective defense in the region.
The reunification of Germany has also changed the strategic landscape. These
events have led to greater debate regarding the presence of U.S. troops in
Germany. For a clearer picture of the future of U.S. bases in Germany, it will be
useful to examine pertinent aspects of Germany's strategic culture.
4. German Strategic Culture and U.S. Basing Issues
Since the end of World War II, there have been American troops on
German soil. This presence has certainly been a part of creating Germany's
strategic culture of today. It will be useful to examine German perceptions
regarding a U.S. presence in their country to gain insight into policy decisions
currently being made.
Differences in public opinion regarding a U.S. presence in Germany can
be traced to differences in key experiences during political socialization. For the
generation of Germans born between 1925 and 1945, the decisive experiences were
the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Crisis. For the generation born after 1945 the
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decisive experience was the conflict in Southeast Asia. These experiences
produced fundamental differences in the image perception of the United States.93
German public opinion of the United States after World War II was
quite high. However, public opinion of the United States during Vietnam and the
Reagan years dropped. This caused an impression that younger Germans had a
more anti-American attitude and that this trend would increase with time.
However, recent surveys indicate a reversal in this trend and an increase in pro-
American sentiment. In a survey conducted late in 1991, 68% of Germans had a
positive view of the United States.94 It is important to note, however, that there
is a difference between pro-American sentiment and support for American troops
on German soil. The old equation that stated that positive attitudes toward the
United States and support for NATO translated into support for an American
troop presence no longer necessarily holds. In 1991, 57% of all Germans favored
a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces. In addition, 70% supported a withdrawal
of all American nuclear weapons.95
It is important to note that the relationship between public opinion and
government policy is a complex one. Politicians respond to, as well as shape
93Harold Mueller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Origins of Estrangement,"
International Security, Summer 1987, p. 53.
94Ronald D. Asmus, Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and





public opinion. Nonetheless, public opinion is a very important political factor
and a useful guide in identifying long-term trends in attitudes and the challenges
such trends pose for governments.
The current trends in public opinion regarding pro-American sentiment
and American troop presence in Germany seem to indicate a positive outlook for
German-American cooperation on the whole, but a German desire to remove U.S.
troops from their soil. Further evidence of a German desire to remove U.S. bases
can be found in a request by Minister President Carl-Ludwig Wagner of
Rheinland Palatine. He asked for the U.S. to shut down some of its largest
installations in that state. The list includes Kaiserslautern, Bitburg, Hahn,
Spangdahlem and Zweibruecken.96 The Pentagon is planning to drastically
reduce U.S. troop levels in Europe, and many these USAFE installations will be
affected. Another important aspect of Germany's strategic culture is its historical
reliance on foreign military forces for security requirements.
Immediately following World War II Germany was occupied by the
allies and was not allowed any military forces of her own. In the 1954 London
and Paris agreements, the FRG was granted membership in the WEU and
subsequently NATO. Germany was allowed to rearm for defensive purposes
with certain restrictions. Certain types of conventional weapons with 'offensive
96Stephen F. Szabo, "The New Germany and European Security," from: Beyond
the Cold War: Current Issues in European Security, The Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C., August 1990, p. 23.
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capabilities' were not allowed to be produced by Germany, as well as NBC
weapons. The 'offensive capabilities' restrictions were gradually lifted beginning
in 1958 and were abolished in January of 1986. The forces that Germany did
possess were to be under NATO control and were not allowed to be used outside
of allied territory. Germany completely depended on the United States and
Britain for a nuclear umbrella and continues to do so today. However, with the
drastic changes in the region, a change in this historical situation may be
developing.
German unification, along with the eventual withdrawal of Soviet
forces from Central Europe, will dramatically change the strategic culture of a
unified Germany. The collapse of the Soviet threat and the need to reorganize the
Bundeswehr have raised basic questions about the purpose, size, and structure
of the German armed forces. Germany is no longer in an extremely exposed
position on the front line of the East-West conflict. Instead, Germany has been
placed in a central position, surrounded by peaceful and- for the time being, at
least- democratic neighbors. This is a strategic transformation of breathtaking
proportions, and German leaders are still coming to grips with its implications.
The strategic landscape may lead to the 'normalization' of Germany. If
'normalization' can be defined in terms of Germany's gradually overcoming many
of the previous constraints rooted in the Cold War conflict, the more difficult
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challenge is defining a positive vision for Germany as a more 'normal' security
policy actor in Europe and beyond.97
There is little doubt that Germany will be required to take a position
of greater responsibility and leadership in the European security system. It seems
that the German public is willing to take on this new responsibility- A 59%
majority supports Germany assuming greater international responsibility.98
Germans see no reason to continue to be treated differently from other major
states in Europe. The growing references to "singularization" of Germany in any
settlement are evidence that the Germans will wish to be treated in the same
manner as the French or the British.99 This 'new' German thinking will have a
significant effect on how Germany views the United States. This is of particular
interest with regard to the future of a U.S. military presence in Germany.
Germany does not favor the creation of an alternative defense structure
through the EC that would exclude the United States. However, this does not
automatically translate into support for an American military presence. Recent
data suggests that support for a U.S. military presence in Germany is eroding and
should therefore discourage a policy of 'business as usual'. 100 The primary
97Ronald D. Asmus, Germany After the Gulf War, N-3391-AF, (Santa Monica,
CA Rand Corporation) p. viii.





explanation for these figures lies in the narrow view that Germans have
traditionally had of NATO and the U.S. military presence. For over forty years
Germans have viewed the alliance, and the U.S. military presence, almost
exclusively in terms of the need to defend the Federal Republic from a specific
threat. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Germans increasingly do not
see the need for such a presence. Although there is some concern about the
consequences of an American troop withdrawal, in the case of a future
deterioration in East-West relations, this does not necessarily translate into
support for an American military presence. 101 However, there are arguments
that support a continued U.S. military presence in Germany.
President Bush has stated that the United States is a European power
and that American troops will remain in Europe so long as they are wanted.
Given the changes in Europe and the overall downward pressure on the size of
the U.S. military, there is a growing tendency to see such a forward deployed
American military presence in Europe and in Germany as fulfilling multiple goals.
First, a future U.S. troop presence in Germany is seen as a hedge against residual
uncertainties and a means to provide political reassurance. Second, it is seen as
an effective forward deployment to help meet Western security interests and
obligations in the Mediterranean and further east. These forces are physically




importantly, they are part of a larger allied force and command structure that can
provide a basis for effective multinational operations.
Whether Germans are willing to support the concept for a future U.S.
military presence that is increasingly tied to "out of area" scenarios is unclear. For
such an agreement to be politically viable in both countries, Germany would have
to openly accept and support such a role for an American military presence and
ideally also participate in supporting such a role. Without those prerequisites the
U.S. runs the risk of U.S. troops in Germany being seen as forward-based means
for American power projection. If the U.S. is to successfully build a new German-
American relationship based on what President Bush termed "partners in
leadership/' it will require an open dialogue that clearly establishes the degree to
which our interests continue to overlap as well as political leadership to ensure
that it is understood and supported on both sides of the Atlantic.
5. United States European Basing Outlook
America's leadership role in NATO is based on the presence of our military
forces in Europe; the ability of the U.S. to influence events in Europe is
derived from our visible and continuing commitment to the alliance. In
order to meet U.S. security requirements in the European Theater, we have
developed a European Base Force, taking into account the new security
environment and constrained fiscal resources. 102
)2General John R. Galvin, op. cit. in n. 69, p. 5.
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The bulk of the troops that make up this base force are stationed in Britain and
Germany. British and German policies regarding U.S. basing issues, partially
derived from their strategic culture, directly affect U.S. military capability in the
region. The dramatic changes that have recently been re-shaping the international
arena are causing the U.S. and our overseas allies to re-evaluate security policies
that date back to the end of World War II.
Alfred Dregger sees a shift in the relative "security weight" of the U.S.-
European partnership in NATO. An American military retrenchment from
Europe is inevitable:
In the train of disarmament and demilitarization, one has to reckon with a
partial withdrawal of American forces from Europe. 103
He views this development as a "natural" one consistent with the global interests
of the United States. The U.S. military is decreasing its military presence in
Europe in response to changing security requirements and economic constraints.
However, the ability to rapidly deploy forces located in Europe is a critical aspect
of current Air Force doctrine.
The U.S. will continue to enjoy basing and overflight rights in these
countries for the foreseeable future. However, as U.S. influence decreases in the
103Alfred Dregger, from: German Perspectives on NATO and European
Security, Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington D.C., August 1991, p. 18.
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region, there may be greater resistance to U.S. actions from these bases unless
completely supported by not only the host country, but by the majority of our
allies. The reason for this is that the political price paid within Europe for
supporting an unpopular military action may be greater than the ramifications
from the U.S.. In this respect, it is essential that the United States continues to
stay actively involved within the European political and military environment.
Our European forward presence protects America and American
interests and provides a link that gives us the opportunity to influence
important decisions that affect our common defense. It is in our best
interests to remain involved and influential in European affairs. In
order to do so, we need a competent, credible, and operationally
significant force in Europe ready for multi-faceted missions. 104
The future structure of European security will certainly include the
United States. The strategic cultures of the participants will influence how the
United States fits into this structure. U.S. basing rights and use privileges directly
affect American strategic agility capabilities. Careful analysis and policy
evaluation regarding these issues and how they are affected by strategic culture
will certainly enhance our ability to formulate effective policy.
MGalvin, op. cit. in n. 69, pp. 11-12.
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B. EFFECTS ON THE U.S. AIR FORCE FROM REORGANIZATION
...Organize to ensure unity of command in peace and in war, under
whatever command structure makes sense. Make sure you have unity of
command, and make sure you practice it..Train like you're gonna fight. 105
A dramatically changing international environment coupled with modern
technological innovations have required a basic re-evaluation of U.S. military force
structures. The United States Air Force is on the leading edge of change and is
reorganizing its fundamental structures in order to perform its missions more
efficiently and effectively. To understand how these reorganizations may affect
the United States Air Force in Europe, this section examines the actual structural
changes being made within the Air Force and the reorganizations occurring
specifically in USAFE and NATO. In addition, it will be important to discuss
how Desert Storm affected these reorganizations and to look at how these changes
may affect future joint and/or combined operations. The changes occurring
within the Air Force are dramatically altering old functional mind-sets.
The Air Force is rethinking the ways it has traditionally operated because
of smaller forces, overseas cutbacks, and a changing world situation. There are
five basic themes the Air Force is following during the reorganization. 106
105General Russell E. Dougherty, "Roots and Wings: A Perspective on




• Decentralization of power from headquarters down to operating units.
• Bolstering the authority of lower echelon commanders.
• Streamlining the organization by removing links in the chain of command.
• Consolidating operations under a single commander.
• Clarifying functional responsibilities.
The Air Force is also incorporating modern management principles such as
streamlining, delayering, empowering and removing roadblocks to improvement.
Revolutions in communications and information transfer alone demand new
methods of leadership and management, with decentralized organizations where
people in the field are able to improve operations and respond quickly to
unexpected change. 107 In addition to improving the way the Air Force will
function, there are dramatic changes in the actual structures.
Significant structural reorganizations are occurring within the major
commands. Three major commands will be reorganized into two new commands.
Tactical Air Command (TAC) is merging with the bomber, nuclear missile and
reconnaissance elements of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to form Air Combat
Command. Responsibilities of Air Combat Command will include deterrence and
air campaign operations used for crisis response. Military Airlift Command
(MAC) will take part of SAC's tanker assets and form the Air Mobility Command
,7
U.S. Air Force White Paper, "Air Force Restructure," September 1991, p. 1.
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(AMC). Air Mobility Command will be responsible for global airlift and aerial
refueling. In addition, Air Force Logistics Command and Air Force System
Command will merge into the new Air Force Material Command. Also the Air
Force Communications Command will be downgraded into a field operating
agency. These changes will reduce the number of major commands from 13 to
10.
108 Other significant changes are occurring at the squadron and wing level.
The old wing structure had a commander, a vice commander, a base
commander, and three deputies, while the new structure consolidates leadership
into a wing commander, a vice and three group commanders. In the squadrons
on-aircraft maintenance is combining with operations to restore the teamwork
between the crews who fly the planes and the chiefs who maintain them. The
creation of composite wings that possess all the assets necessary for rapid air
response to any threat is also a significant result of the reorganizations. Wings
and squadrons have dropped "Strategic" or "Tactical" from their names in an
effort to remove artificial distinctions and emphasize that air power is most
effective when employed as an integrated whole. 109 These bottom up changes
will be integrated into the overseas forces to give them the flexibility required to
effectively perform their mission.
108
Julie Bird and Joe West, "SAC, TAC, MAC to Become 2 Commands," Air
Force Times, 30 Sept 91, no. 8, pp. 4-6.
109General Merill A. McPeak, "Air Force Restructure: A Status Report,"
Foundation Forum a collection from presentations to the Air Force Association,
January 1992, p. 2.
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Many of same reasons that compelled the U.S. Air Force to reorganize have
also encouraged the NATO alliance to restructure, the most significant reason is
that the collapse of the Soviet Union has fundamentally changed the regional
security environment. The massive, linear, defensive forces that NATO had built
up needed to be replaced by more dynamic, fluid, flexible, and multifaceted
forces. This fact has necessitated the requirement for USAFE and NATO to
dramatically restructure their forces.
Major restructuring within USAFE includes giving up more than 400 of its
700 fighter aircraft. 110 However, USAFE will be acquiring its own refueling
tankers and airlift aircraft. With these changes USAFE is better preparing itself
under the new mobility concept, with all its forces in the theater under a single
commander.
USAFE is also eliminating some organizational layers and streamlining
others. Two numbered air forces, 3d Air Force at Mildenhall and the 17th Air
Force at Sembach AB, Germany are to cut back to fewer than 100 persons from
a previous 185 to 190. The focus at these locations will be the flying missions and
preparations to receive reinforcements when and if required. 111 Like the U.S.
Air Force, NATO is making significant changes to its major command structures.




One major change is that NATO is eliminating one of its three basic combat
commands. The Alliance will maintain Allied Command Europe and Allied
Command Atlantic, but will disband Alliance Command Channel. Subordinate
commands to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) will include:
Allied Forces Central Europe, Allied Forces Southern Europe, and Allied Forces
Northwest. Within Allied Forces Central Europe five primary subcommands have
been reorganized into two entities: Air Forces Central Europe and Land Forces
Central Europe. The Air Force Central structure will combine the old 2d Allied
Tactical Air Force and the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force and will be based at
Ramstein AB, Germany. 112
NATO military restructuring began shortly before August 2, 1990, when Iraq
invaded Kuwait, but the performance of U.S. and Allied forces in the Gulf War
has come to serve as a model for USAFE and other NATO air forces planning
mobile and multinational operations. An example can be seen by examining the
new NATO headquarters structure which, by coincidence or not, closely
resembles that used in the Gulf War, where General Schwarzkopf had air, land,
and sea component commanders under his command.
Another example of how Desert Storm affected NATO reorganization
involves the changes taking place in the central tasking agency. Within this
agency planners examine threats, lay out the targets, and plot the courses for a
ll2Grossman, op. cit. in n. 32, p. 31.
composite force of fighters as allocated by the commander. In the current setup,
this agency is the Allied Tactical Operations Center. After the reorganizations are
complete, it will be the Combined Air Operations Center which will deal directly
with the combat units. This concept builds on the experience from composite
wings in the Gulf War.
A change that USAFE is making as a result of the Gulf War involves
logistical support. There are major changes being made with how USAFE stores
munitions and other war reserve material, the U.S Air Force having learned from
Desert Shield and Desert Storm that these supplies are not easy to move or
transport. These supplies are now being containerized and made ready for swift
movement via railway to ports. 113 The Gulf War not only influenced
reorganizations occurring within USAFE and NATO, it also demonstrated the
importance of joint operations.
A few years ago I was taught that Jointness basically meant getting
everybody lined up shoulder to shoulder. Now I know that real jointness
means attacking the right target at the right time with the right force. 114
Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that an increased emphasis placed on
joint operations translates to an effective combat force package. Old interservice
113
Ibid., p. 76.
114Major Mark B. Rogers, from: The Pentagon, Toint Warfare of the U.S. Armed
Forces, November 1991, p. 68
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rivalries and parochialism are giving way to cooperation for the greater good.
While the services have acted grudgingly at times with regard to joint operations,
the Gulf War has solidified resolve that this is the correct way to conduct warfare
and hence train. Recent service strategy documents have indicated an open
approach towards joint operations. The recent Navy strategy document "...From
the Sea" states:
The success of modern U.S. military strategy depends on forces organized,
trained, and equipped for the division of combat labor. 115
The Air Force strategy document "Global Reach-Global Power" explains:
The future holds significant opportunity for complementary Air Force and
naval operations that capitalize on the unique characteristics of both. In the
future we can best achieve specific military and political objectives by
capitalizing upon the advantages of both land-based and naval forces. 116
Continued cooperation between the services will enhance the United States war
fighting capability. However, as Joint Pub 1 emphasizes, joint warfare does not
lessen individual service traditions, cohesion, or expertise. Successful joint
operations are impossible without capabilities developed and embodied in each
115Department of the United States Navy, "...From the Sea," September 1992,
p. 4.
116
U.S. Air Force, op. cit. in n. 15, p. 10.
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service. As Desert Storm emphasized, joint operations will take on increased
significance in the new world order. New security threats will be difficult to
predict and will place a premium on flexible combat operations brought to bear
by multiple aspects of the United States military.
Joint force employment is a hallmark of our times. It is a dictate of our
congress, it makes sense, and it is the right thing to do. This nation is not
an island; it lives in the world. Our services cannot survive alone, and
certainly they cannot fight alone in all the circumstances we must face. 117
Desert Storm also emphasized the importance of preparing for combined
operations. In the new international environment military cooperation among
U.S. allies will play a significant role. The solidarity of the U.N. coalition was a
critical aspect of the victory in the Gulf War. It is probable that future
contingencies may involve coalition type forces, and it makes sense that these
forces should train together as much as possible. As well as honing the combat
skills that these combined units require, peace time military cooperation fosters
closer international relationships that may provide future political avenues for the
U.S..
Greater emphasis on combined and joint operations will increase U.S.
combat effectiveness. Reorganizations within the U.S. Air Force and NATO will
streamline operations and may enhance the ability of the United States and the
7Dougherty, op. cit. in n. 105, p. 12.
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Alliance to prevail in the new political and military landscape. An ongoing
examination of these issues will provide valuable insight about U.S. and allied
forces that may be of significant use in future policy formulation.
C. ARMS CONTROL AND THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN EUROPE
With the end of the Cold War, the United States military is facing drastic
reductions and force reorganizations. These changes are driven by many factors
including budgetary constraints and strategic realities. In addition, arms control
negotiations play a role in shaping the future of the United States military. The
United States Air Force in Europe (USAFE) could very well be further affected by
conventional arms control negotiations. Arms control negotiations that could
affect these forces are the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the
Open Skies Treaty. Even though conventional arms control negotiations may not
be a major factor driving Air Force sizing and structuring, they certainly do play
a significant role. To better understand the future of the United States Air Forces
in Europe, it is useful to analyze the ramifications of these negotiations.
A logical approach in analyzing these treaties is to begin with a description
of the treaty itself, followed with a discussion of disputed topics to better
understand the political and military questions involved, and finally an
assessment of how these treaties could affect the United States Air Force in
Europe. One major arms control agreement that will affect the sizing and
structuring of air forces in Europe is the CFE treaty.
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1. Conventional Arms Control
On 19 November 1990 the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe was signed by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and
members of the Warsaw Pact at a summit meeting of the CSCE in Paris. CFE
negotiations resulted in the most far-reaching arms control treaty that has ever
been concluded, requiring significant reductions and establishing ceilings in five
major categories of conventional weapons (tanks, artillery, armored fighting
vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters). The treaty limits the non-
nuclear forces of the participating countries in an area extending from the Atlantic
Ocean to the Ural Mountains (ATTU). The treaty itself consists of twenty-three
articles and associated protocols. Articles II through VII deal with the provisions
on weapons in Europe. Article IV limits the total number of combat aircraft for
each group of State Parties to 6,800 aircraft. Article VI limits each State party to
no more than 5,150.m Under provisions of the Treaty, both of these figures
need to be met no later than 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty. The
target date for ratification by all members is July 1992. 119
According to Article II section (K) of the Treaty, a combat aircraft is
defined as "A fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft armed and equipped
to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns,
,18Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
119Col Rafaenelli, "Conventional Arms Control," handout and lecture at Naval
Postgraduate School, 3 June 1992.
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cannons, or other weapons of destruction, as well as any model or version of such
aircraft which performs other military functions such as reconnaissance or electric
warfare. The term 'combat aircraft7 does not include primary trainer aircraft." 120
Under the provisions of the Treaty, the only Western country that needs to make
any reductions is Germany. The Germans have a CFE ceiling of 900 combat
aircraft and are currently holding 1,018 aircraft. The United Kingdom and the
United States will not be required to make any combat aircraft reductions. In
contrast, The East will be required to make cuts of 1,461 combat aircraft. 121
One of the disputes between the West and the Soviet Union related to
how the Soviets classified portions of their forces. The issue was whether certain
weapons the Soviets say are assigned to Coast Guard, Naval infantry, and
Strategic rocket units should be covered. The Soviet line of argument was that
the mandate only covered conventional armed forces - and thus not strategic -
and that it also excluded all Naval forces, including its permanently land-based
components. By taking this position, the Soviets excluded a total of 5,457 pieces
of armaments and equipment from their ceilings, thereby decreasing their overall
reduction by the same number. 122
120CFE Treaty, op. cit. in n. 118.
121John D. Morracco, "NATO Plans Call for Boosting Number of Combat
Aircraft Under CFE Treaty," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 15, 1991.
122Ambassador Lambert W. Veenendaal, "Conventional Stability in Europe in
1991: Problems and Solutions," NATO Review, August 1991.
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Article III of the Treaty, which contains the counting rule, clearly
stipulates that all battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft
and attack helicopters as defined in the Treaty within the area of application,
should fall under its ceilings. Therefore, the Soviet equipment holdings in
question should have been counted under the ceilings of the Treaty.
The disputes were eventually resolved to the satisfaction of all
participants and was confirmed in Vienna on June 14, 1991. During this meeting
the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw from the ATTU zone an equivalent amount
of equipment to that of the disputed holdings with the Coastal defense and Naval
infantry. In addition, it was explicitly reaffirmed that all armaments and
equipments within Treaty limited categories and based on land - except for some
explicitly agreed categories - would be subject to all numerical limitations
stipulated by the Treaty.
A crucial issue raised by the disintegration of the Soviet central
government is what happens to Soviet arms control obligations. Which of the
resulting entities will be bound by the Treaties the Soviet Union entered into?
This is an extremely complicated issue involving international law and political
maneuvering among the former Soviet republics.
Immediately following the August 1991 coup attempt, and the
subsequent break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia and the other republics
informally agreed to adhere to the Soviet signed CFE Treaty. This seems to have
been formally resolved as of 6 June 1992, as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
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Khazakhstan, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbajan formally signed the
CFE Treaty. Other problems result from this situation (i.e. the
Khazakhstan/Russia border east of the Urals). However, it appears additional
problems will be resolved without reopening the CFE Treaty. Reopening the
Treaty could force complicated adjustments to the document from member
nations who were not completely pleased with the initial CFE Treaty.
The limits established by the CFE treaty for combat aircraft are 6,800
per side with a 5,150 limit for one country. In addition, it was decided that
participants would undertake a political commitment outside the CFE Treaty
limiting land-based naval aircraft to 430 on each side. 123 Currently the US has
approximately 626 combat aircraft deployed in Europe. Under provisions of the
treaty and current NATO plans, the U.S is allocated a total of 784 aircraft. 124
The U.S. will certainly not fill this allocation, but it does leave room for future
deployments in the event of a crisis or unforseen political shift.
Given these numerical limitations set by the Treaty, certain aspects of
U.S. and NATO operational concepts will change. Reduced force-to-space ratios
will have to be compensated for by increased tactical mobility. The operational
concept of FOFA was designed to break the mass and tempo of a numerically
superior and technologically inferior enemy before engagement in a close-in
123
Rafaenelli, op. cit. in n. 119.
124Morraco, op. cit. in n. 121.
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ground battle by attacking the enemies' uncommitted forces behind the Forward
Line of Own Troops (FLOT). Force parity and technological advances on both
sides in Europe called for the FOFA concept to be refined into what is now called
Joint Precision Interdiction (JPI). The JPI concept expands the planning,
coordination, and execution on interdiction of not only an enemy's uncommitted
forces but also his mobility-producing potential. 125 Thus, the CFE Treaty has
affected the means in which the U.S. and NATO will operate in future regional
conflicts. Another conventional arms control treaty that is significant to discuss
is the Open Skies Treaty.
On March 24 1992, 24 countries including Russia, Belarus, Georgia, and
Ukraine concluded a treaty on Open Skies in Vienna. The Open Skies Treaty will
allow participants to overfly the territory of other participants with observation
aircraft equipped with various sensor equipment. Open Skies is designed to
improve mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participating
countries, regardless of size, a direct role in gathering information about military
forces and activities that concern them. The four principal elements involved
with the Treaty include; 126
• Territory- All participants must agree to make all of their territory accessible
to aerial observation.
125Lt Col Jack W. Ellertson and Lt Col Alan K. Huffman, "Joint Precision
Interdiction in the Post CFE Environment," Military Review, July 1991.
126
Rafaenelli, op. cit. in n. 119.
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Aircraft- All observation flights will be conducted on unarmed aircraft
provided either by the observing country or the observed country. All
aircraft used in Open Skies will be subjected to rigorous certification and
inspection procedures to ensure that the sensors on board meet the
standards of the Treaty and that sensors which are not permitted are not
installed.
Sensors- Aircraft may be equipped with video cameras, panoramic and
framing cameras for daylight photography, infrared line scanning systems
which can operate day and night in any weather. To ensure the fullest
possible participation the Treaty provides that sensors which are used shall
be commercially available to all participants.
Quota- Each participating country has agreed to an annual quota of
observation flights which it is willing to accept from other participants.
Quotas are loosely scaled to the size of the country, with the smallest
participants having two or four flights each. The United States and Russia,
as the largest participants, have accepted quotas of 42 annual observation
flights each. The number of flights actually conducted over a country and
which other country conducts the flight will depend on the particular
concerns of individual countries and on how the international situation
develops.
Original disputes focused on Soviet unwillingness to open large parts
of its territory to overflights because of security concerns. However, in November
of 1991 Moscow agreed to open its entire territory to overflights. Other disputed
areas include which country will supply the aircraft and equipment for the
overflight. The U.S. originally insisted that the inspecting country should use its
own planes and pilots for inspection of other countries. However, the U.S. has
since modified their views and has agreed to use other countries' equipment as
long as the equipment performs satisfactorily and foreign inspectors have access
to the cockpit. Other problems that remain now concern creating a "pool" of
aircraft to use by the international committee, the scheduling of overflights, and
the dissemination of raw data collected on the flights.
For the United States the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) will be
responsible for conducting and receiving Open Skies flights in coordination with
the Department of Defense and other relevant agencies. The plan right now is to
use one to three C-135's as inspection aircraft for the U.S.. The Air Force will
likely supply pilots and support for these overflights within the Open Skies
Treaty. Greater effects could arise as the data is collected and analyzed.
Information from these flights could be used by the U.S. and NATO to update
operational concepts currently employed. However, it seems more than likely
that the primary result from an Open Skies Treaty will be greater openness and
trust among the participating countries.
2. Nuclear Arms Control
Arms control agreements with significant impact have been the INF
Treaty and the START Treaty. In December 1987 the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Force Treaty was agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union. The INF
Treaty eliminated all ground based intermediate-range missiles from both sides.
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed between the United
States and the Soviet Union on 31 July 1991. The START Treaty limits the
number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles -- ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy
bombers -- of each party to 1,600. The total number of accountable, deployed
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nuclear warheads is limited to 6,000 for each party. In addition, the Treaty
stipulated a 4,900 limit for warheads on ballistic missiles.
While these limitations are a significant step in nuclear weapons
reductions, they have already been surpassed by separate proposals between
President Bush and President Yeltsin. If these proposals are accepted by both
sides, the U.S. ICBM forces will consist of 500 Minuteman III missiles with a
single-warhead configuration. The only nuclear-capable strategic bombers
allowed under these proposals would be 1,000 warheads on 95 B-52Hs and 272
warheads on 17 B-2s (currently there are plans to build only 20 B-2s of which
three will be test platforms). 127 The B-l bomber, originally a nuclear-only
bomber, would assume a purely conventional role under these proposals.
Regardless of the eventual outcome of these ongoing arms control discussions, the
United States will maintain nuclear forces in Europe for the foreseeable future.
Arms control negotiations are helping to re-shape current military and
political postures. Effects from arms control agreements will be felt throughout
the region by all parties involved. Nuclear arms control agreements are designed
to lower tensions and foster a new period of cooperation. The CFE Treaty will
have significant, long lasting effects, which hopefully, will result in greater
European stability and international cooperation. The U.S. Air Force in Europe
will be required to provide support for the Open Skies Treaty and re-think
127Jack Mendelsohn, "Factfile: Past and Projected Strategic Nuclear Forces,"
Arms Control Today, July/August 1992, p. 36.
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operational concepts currently employed in the theater due to changes in the
strategic environment brought about, in part, by current arms control
negotiations. Prudence dictates continuing evaluation on the ramifications of




The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy present.. .As our
case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall
ourselves. 128
The United States is adapting to the new world order by re-shaping its
national security and national military strategies to better face the challenges this
new order brings. Military strategies are no longer founded on the old
international paradigm of East vs West. The new environment requires flexibility
and rapid mobility to respond to regional crises and conflicts. The ability to
successfully prevail militarily in these types of contingencies will require greater
emphasis on both airlift and tactical aviation capabilities. An examination of
relevant issues influencing the United States Air Force provides insight into
regional security postures and operational requirements.
The United States is closely linked with Europe and there has been a long term
U.S. Air Force presence in the region dedicated to insuring U.S. interests by
bolstering European security and well being. The United States Air Force in
Europe will continue to operate in concert with U.S. allies within the security
128
"Annual Message to Congress, December 1, 1862," in Abraham Lincoln,
Speeches and Writings, 1859-1865 (New York: Library of America /Viking Press,
1889), 415.
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framework provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. According to
current plans there will be approximately three forward deployed active duty
fighter wings stationed in Europe capable of performing crisis response operations
in the region. In addition to these forward deployed forces, there will be two
active duty fighter wings located in CONUS tailored to fight in the Atlantic
region. Including reserve units there will be a total of eleven fighter wings
planned and available for operations focused in the area. While the Air Force in
Europe is being reduced in size, it is adjusting and reorganizing to more
effectively and efficiently perform its still critical roles within and based from the
region.
One important role the U.S. Air Force will continue to fulfill involves
providing Europe with viable nuclear forces. U.S. theater nuclear forces located
in Europe will consist solely of dual-capable fighter/attack aircraft which will be
limited to using gravity dropped bombs. CONUS based ICBMs, strategic
bombers, and SSBNs also contribute towards allied nuclear guarantees. Providing
our European allies with a credible nuclear commitment serves as a deterrent
against hostile actions and reduces incentives for many European nations to
acquire nuclear weapons of their own.
Effective strategic agility will be an essential element in successfully dealing
with any contingency of the future. Within Europe and the surrounding region,
it will be critical for the U.S. to maintain base usage and overfly rights. As U.S.
influence decreases in the region, there may be greater resistance to U.S. actions
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from these bases unless completely supported by not only the host country, but
by the majority of our allies. In this respect, it is essential that the United States
continue to stay actively involved within the European political and military
environment.
Other significant issues include current military strategy and structural
reorganizations as well as arms control agreements. Current reorganizations, both
in the U.S. and NATO, will significantly affect Air Force operations in the future.
Changing threats, new technologies, and strategic innovations are changing the
structure of our forces and re-directing the way they will fight. Continuing arms
control agreements will have a significant effect on the size of our future forces
and the missions they can accomplish. It will be important to continually
examine these issues to better evaluate and update methods of operation.
A United States Air Force presence in Europe promotes stability in the region
and displays an ongoing U.S. commitment towards a peaceful and prosperous
Europe. In addition, these forces enable the U.S. to have an important voice in
European security matters that directly affect the United States. Finally, a United
States Air Force presence in Europe provides flexible and mobile combat forces
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